Monthly Archives: December 2010
Halting donations to the JNF undoubtedly ranks high on the list of unhelpful responses to Israel’s Carmel fire. But it pales beside that of Israel’s own prime minister: using the fact that Turkey was one of 18 nations that helped extinguish the blaze as an excuse to “mend relations” with Ankara by apologizing and paying compensation for May’s raid on a Turkish-sponsored flotilla to Gaza.
The deal may yet fall through, since Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan still insists that Israel “apologize” for the raid, in which nine Turks were killed, while Benjamin Netanyahu wants merely to “regret” the deaths. But Israel has already reportedly agreed to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in compensation to the killed and wounded “activists.”
Netanyahu claims that this will be “humanitarian” compensation, not an admission of fault. That’s tommyrot. When you apologize and pay compensation, you’re admitting fault, whether you say so explicitly or not. That means Israel is tacitly implying either that it was wrong to enforce its naval blockade of Gaza — established to keep Hamas from shipping in boatloads of arms with which to attack it — or that its soldiers were wrong to fire in self-defense when brutally assaulted by the flotilla’s passengers.
Even worse, Israel would thereby absolve the real culprits: the Turkish organization IHH, whose “activists” deliberately laid an ambush, and the Turkish government, which, according to information that emerged after the raid, was involved in the flotilla at the highest levels. None of the numerous other flotillas to Gaza has produced any casualties, because their passengers didn’t attack Israeli soldiers. The Turkish flotilla would have been similarly casualty-free had its “activists” not launched a violent assault.
Indeed, since IHH sent most noncombatants below deck before beginning its assault, the passengers Israel would be compensating were almost certainly active participants in the attack. As Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman correctly said (via his aides), this is “surrendering to terror,” pure and simple.
But it gets even worse — because Israel would also thereby whitewash Turkey’s turn toward Islamic extremism under Erdogan, when it should be leading the effort to get the West to acknowledge this about-face and respond appropriately.
By crawling to Erdogan in this fashion — after six months of correctly insisting that Israel would neither apologize nor pay compensation — Netanyahu implies that Turkey is still a valued ally, both for Israel and, by implication, for other Western countries. Yet in reality, Ankara openly works against Israeli interests in every possible forum (for instance, regarding NATO’s missile defense system); it had halted joint military exercises even before the flotilla; and Jerusalem no longer trusts it not to share Israeli secrets with Iran. Thanks to WikiLeaks, we now know that even America’s ambassador to Turkey concluded that “Erdogan simply hates Israel.” So what could Israel possibly gain by “mending ties” with it?
Thus, on every possible front, Netanyahu’s overture to Turkey sends exactly the wrong message. This is gross diplomatic malfeasance. And Israel’s friends should make that clear to him before it’s too late.
J.E. Dyer’s excellent post yesterday correctly noted that this week’s talks with Iran, like the previous rounds, will merely buy Tehran more time to advance its nuclear program. That the West would commit such folly shows it has yet to learn a crucial lesson of the Vietnam War: though it sees compromise as the ultimate solution to any conflict, its opponents’ aim is often total victory.
Henry Kissinger, national security adviser and then secretary of state during Vietnam, expounded on this difference at a State Department conference this fall. As Haaretz reported:
The Americans sought a compromise; the North Vietnamese a victory, to replace the regime in the south and to unite the two halves of Vietnam under their rule. When they became stronger militarily, they attacked; when they were blocked, they agreed to bargain; when they signed an agreement, they waited for an opportunity to break it and win.
That same disconnect between the parties’ goals exists today over Iran’s nuclear program. The West repeatedly says its goal is compromise. Even as the UN approved new sanctions against Tehran in June, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said her ultimate aim was to get Iran “back at the negotiating table.” And when the EU discussed additional sanctions in July, its high representative for foreign policy, Catherine Ashton, insisted that “The purpose of all this is to say, ‘We’re serious, we need to talk.’ … Nothing would dissuade me from the fact that talks should happen.”
Iran, however, isn’t seeking compromise; it’s playing to win. And that explains all its diplomatic twists and turns, like scrapping last year’s deal to send some of its low-enriched uranium abroad immediately after signing it.
Diplomats and journalists, convinced that Iran, too, wants compromise, have espoused strained explanations, like disagreements between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his chief backer, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. But once you realize that Iran’s goal is victory, it’s clear that Tehran never intended to give up its uranium. It merely wanted time to develop its nuclear program further before new sanctions were imposed. The scrapped deal bought it a year: first the months of talks; then more time wasted in efforts to lure Iran back to the deal it walked out of; and finally, months spent negotiating the new sanctions, which weren’t discussed previously for fear of scuttling the chances of a deal.
Now Tehran again feels pressured, so, like Hanoi, it’s agreeing to bargain. It’s no accident that after months of preliminary jockeying, Iran finally set a date for the talks immediately after the WikiLeaks cables made worldwide headlines. The cables’ revelation of an Arab consensus for military action against Tehran gives new ammunition to an incoming Congress already inclined to be tougher on Iran and also facilitates a potential Israeli military strike: who now would believe the inevitable Arab denunciations afterward?
So Iran, cognizant of the West’s weakness, has taken out the perfect insurance policy: as long as it’s talking, feeding the West’s hope for compromise, Western leaders will oppose both new sanctions and military action. And Tehran will be able to continue its march toward victory unimpeded.
Last week, Britain’s new government submitted legislation to amend its universal jurisdiction law, under which pro-Palestinian groups have repeatedly tried to indict Israeli ministers and army officers for “war crimes” in the West Bank and Gaza. Last year, Spain did the same, and in 2003, so did Belgium, thereby eliminating two other popular venues for anti-Israel “lawfare.”
That countries initially sympathetic to the idea have since moved to excise
lawfare from their own courts is obviously encouraging. Yet Europe continues to
encourage lawfare in international venues, seemingly oblivious to the fact that this is equally detrimental to its own interests.
The countries that changed their national laws did so not because they suddenly
became pro-Israel, but because they realized that lawfare was indeed undermining
their own interests.
First, they could hardly play an important role in
the “peace process” if no Israeli official would enter them for fear of being
arrested. That had increasingly become the case, since lawfare practitioners
targeted all Israelis indiscriminately: Last year, they even sought a British warrant against Europe’s
favorite Israeli, former foreign minister Tzipi Livni. And for whatever reason,
involvement in the peace process matters greatly to the European Union: A study done by Finnish
Foreign Minister Alex Stubb this fall found that while EU foreign ministers had
devoted only one meeting over the past four years to China, a rising foreign
policy power, they discussed “the Middle East peace process” 12 separate times
in 2009 and the first part of 2010 alone.
Second, they couldn’t be
important players in any international arena if American officials refused to
enter them. That’s why Belgium, which seemed untroubled by anti-Israel cases,
moved quickly to change its law after lawfare enthusiasts, emboldened by initial
successes against Israel, sought warrants against senior American officials for alleged war crimes in
Iraq.
In contrast, Europe continues to facilitate lawfare in the
International Criminal Court. Most EU countries abstained in both the UN Human
Rights Council and the General Assembly votes on the Goldstone Report, which
urged an ICC indictment against Israel for “war crimes” in Gaza; a few even
voted for it. Last year, Germany even asked the US not to
block UN Security Council action on Goldstone unless Israel froze settlement
construction (Washington declined). Nor has Europe protested the ICC’s consideration of a
Palestinian Authority request to be treated as a state for the purpose of
joining the court and filing war-crimes charges against Israel, though this
amounts to retroactively amending the treaty (which doesn’t allow non-state
parties) without existing signatories’ consent.
Yet all the same
arguments hold against ICC prosecutions. First, an ICC warrant against Israeli
officials would preclude them from visiting Europe, which is treaty-bound to
enforce it. But more importantly, as the Belgium precedent shows, success
against Israel would embolden lawfare practitioners to pursue other countries,
America would obviously be first: As the country most actively engaged in
counterterrorist warfare, it has increasingly adopted Israeli tactics. For
instance, its drone strikes on suspected terrorists, whose legality Washington
recently defended in the UN, are identical to the Israeli
“targeted killings” that human rights organizations have repeatedly denounced as
“extrajudicial executions.” Indeed, a Spanish court seriously considered
indicting top Israeli officials and army officers over one such killing, of
Hamas mastermind Saleh Shehadeh in 2002; the case was dropped only because
Spain amended the universal jurisdiction law under which it was
filed.
Similarly, The New York Times reported
last month that
American forces “have been systematically destroying” hundreds of houses and
farm buildings in Afghanistan’s Kandahar region, because the Taliban had
booby-trapped so many that searching them “was often too dangerous.” Israel did
the same thing in its war in Gaza two years ago, for the same reason: Hamas had
systematically booby-trapped hundreds of homes,
schools and other buildings. And human rights organizations, followed by the
Goldstone Report, deemed it a war crime, accusing Israel of wantonly destroying
property in a deliberate effort to target civilians.
But many European
countries also have troops in Afghanistan, and they would be next in line. Last
year, for instance, a German officer ordered an air strike in Afghanistan that
killed as many as 142 people, mainly civilians, due to faulty intelligence. That
dwarfs the 14 other people (also mainly civilians) killed in the Shehadeh
strike, similarly due to faulty intelligence, or the 13 killed at the Ibrahim
al-Maqadmah Mosque during the Gaza war, for which Goldstone wants Israel indicted in the ICC (Israel says the mosque wasn’t
hit intentionally).
Moreover, like Israel, Germany deemed criminal or
disciplinary action against the officer unwarranted – opening the way for the
ICC, which can only pursue cases that national governments don’t prosecute. Yet
two months after this deadly strike, Berlin urged Washington not to block
Security Council action on Goldstone if Israel didn’t freeze settlement
construction – apparently oblivious to the dangerous precedent a
Goldstone-inspired ICC case against Israel could set for itself.
The
problem is that most European countries still believe ICC prosecutions could be
confined to Israel: that nobody would ever lump them together with the loathed
Jewish state. But ultimately, lawfare enthusiasts won’t distinguish between
“evil” Israel and “good” Europe any more than they distinguish between extremist
settlers and Tzipi Livni. They are simply smart enough to realize that it’s
easier to set a precedent by prosecuting an unpopular country first. Then, once
the precedent is set, they will gleefully use it against everyone.
The writer is a journalist and commentator.
One cable from the WikiLeaks trove raises a disturbing possibility: the Obama administration’s obsession with Israeli settlements could end up undermining America’s own war on terror.
Shortly before Israel announced a 10-month freeze on settlement construction last year, Germany urged Washington to threaten that absent such a moratorium, the U.S. would refuse to block a UN Security Council vote on the Goldstone Report, which accused Israel of war crimes in Gaza. U.S. officials correctly responded that this would be “counterproductive” but agreed to tell Israel “that their policy on settlements was making it difficult for their friends to hold the line in the UNSC” — thus implying that Washington might so threaten in the future. And last month, the U.S. indeed implicitly conditioned future efforts to block Goldstone on another settlement freeze.
Yet America has a vital interest of its own in burying Goldstone: facing many of the same military problems in its war on terror that Israel does, it has increasingly adopted many of the same tactics.
Last month, for example, the New York Times reported that in Afghanistan’s Kandahar region, “American forces are encountering empty homes and farm buildings left so heavily booby-trapped by Taliban insurgents that the Americans have been systematically destroying hundreds of them” in order “to reduce civilian and military casualties.” They even destroyed houses that weren’t booby-trapped because “searching empty houses was often too dangerous.” And as an Afghan official correctly noted, “It’s the insurgents and the enemy of the country that are to blame for this destruction, because they have planted mines in civilian houses and main roads everywhere.”
This is precisely what Israel did in its 2008-09 Gaza war, for the same reason: it found hundreds of booby-trapped houses, schools, even a zoo. But Goldstone, like the so-called human rights organizations, pooh-poohed this claim, accusing Israel of wantonly destroying civilian property in a deliberate effort to target civilians. Far from blaming Hamas for booby-trapping houses, they blamed Israel for destroying the traps.
The same goes for drone strikes on wanted terrorists — not just in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan and Yemen. Israel has used this tactic for years, also for the same reason: sometimes, it’s the only way to neutralize a dangerous terrorist short of a major ground operation with massive casualties on both sides. But aerial strikes can also produce unintended civilian casualties.
The U.S. recently defended this tactic to the UN Human Rights Council, stressing that targeted killings are “lawful, they constitute neither extrajudicial killing nor political assassination.”
But human rights organizations have repeatedly denounced similar Israeli strikes as “extrajudicial executions” even when there have been no civilian casualties. And the outcry has been much worse when there were. Just last year, for instance, a Spanish court considered indicting several senior Israeli officials over a 2002 strike on Hamas mastermind Salah Shehadeh that, due to flawed intelligence, also killed 14 other people. (The case was halted after Spain moved to amend its universal-jurisdiction law.)
In short, America’s own self-interest demands that it thwart legal assaults on Israeli counterterrorism tactics. Otherwise, it’s liable to find itself in the dock next.