Analysis from Israel
Russia makes clear it would continue its hostile policies regardless of Israel-Georgia relations.

You have to give Kadima credit for loyalty: As the Bush administration was destroying any remaining credibility, and undermining its country’s interests, by abandoning a loyal and strategically important ally to Russia’s tender mercies, Israel’s ruling party decided it could not allow its American friends to shoulder the disgrace alone; it, too, should betray Georgia at the expense of its country’s interests. So the minute Russia invaded – just when Georgia needed arms most – Israel, which had hitherto been a prominent Georgian supplier, halted all arms shipments.

One might legitimately ask how this undermined the national interest. After all, Israel desperately needs Russian help on several crucial issues, ranging from Iran’s nuclear program to Hizbullah’s rearmament, and Israel needs Georgian help not at all. Moreover, Russia has made its unhappiness with arms sales to Georgia clear. Thus Kadima seemingly made the correct realpolitik choice.

The problem is that, according to government officials themselves, not only did the country receive no quid pro quo for halting the shipments, but Russia has repeatedly and explicitly declared that it will continue its anti-Israel policies regardless of whether or not Jerusalem sells arms to Georgia. Thus Israel gained nothing by betraying Georgia, while undermining two secondary but still significant interests.

RUSSIA IS currently harming vital Israeli interests in at least four ways. First, it is the main opponent of significant diplomatic sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program. It has used its Security Council veto to ensure that all sanctions approved to date are too toothless to affect Iran’s behavior, thereby bringing Israel ever closer to an unpalatable choice between a nuclear Iran and a military strike of uncertain benefit but certain costs.

Second, Russia has actively facilitated Iran’s nuclear program by building and supplying fuel for the reactor in Bushehr. Third, it is planning to supply advanced S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Iran, which would make any Israeli military strike far more dangerous. And finally, it is already supplying advanced weaponry to Syria, which Damascus is sharing with Hizbullah. Thus anything that could alter Russia’s behavior on any of these four points would clearly be worth Israel’s while.

However, government officials told the local media last week that while Russia has repeatedly complained about arms sales to Georgia in response to Israeli complaints on these issues, it has also refused to make a deal. On the contrary: It has consistently declared its current policies nonnegotiable.

Nevertheless, the government decided to unilaterally halt arms shipments to Georgia in the hopes that, despite Moscow’s repeated declarations to the contrary, it might still change its mind. As one official put it, “The day we want to prevent a future deal with Iran, our hands must be clean.”

In other words, it sacrificed concrete assets on the altar of wishful thinking.

But given that Georgia has nothing Israel really needs, what assets did the country sacrifice? The answer to that is twofold.

First, betraying an ally in its hour of greatest need always entails a price: It deters potential future allies, by showing that allying with Israel does not pay. And the effect is compounded when the betrayal is in favor of a party that, like Vladimir Putin’s Russia, has been consistently hostile to Israel’s interests: This shows that not only does befriending Israel not pay, but working against it does, because it will then seek to appease you.

GRANTED, ISRAEL has already betrayed allies in favor of enemies so many times that one might think one more example could make no difference. Just consider, for example, its abandonment of the South Lebanon Army to Hizbullah; its ongoing budgetary neglect of loyal Druse communities even as it allocates extra funds to Arab communities that reject the Jewish state’s very existence; or its willingness to release hundreds of prisoners to Hizbullah and Hamas while refusing to release a paltry two dozen to our most reliable regional ally, Jordan.

Yet like any bad habit, each repetition only makes the habit harder to kick – and any attempt to kick it has to start somewhere. A decision to stand by Georgia despite Russia’s displeasure might have signaled players closer to home that this country was starting to rethink this destructive pattern of behavior. And precisely because Russia made it clear that it would continue its hostile policies regardless of Israel’s relations with Georgia – meaning that supporting this particular ally entailed no costs – this would have been a uniquely easy place to start.

THE SECOND asset Israel sacrificed is its reputation as a credible arms supplier. After all, who would want to buy arms from a country that will suspend shipments just when you need them most? And given the importance of the local arms industry to national security, this is nontrivial.

Israel originally developed an arms industry because other countries routinely suspended shipments to it when it was most in need. Over the last four decades, it has largely replaced the doctrine of self-sufficiency with dependence on American arms, but it still relies on its own industry both for solutions to problems ignored by American companies – Israel, for instance, began developing specialized urban counterterrorism equipment long before the US did – and for equipment that Washington refuses to sell it.

However, the IDF is not a big enough client to support a sophisticated arms industry on its own. Thus to be financially viable, the industry must export. And that will not be possible if it develops a reputation for cutting off supplies just when the client needs them most.

Had Russia been willing to accommodate Israel on any of its main concerns, one could have argued that the benefits of sacrificing Georgia outweighed the costs. But to incur the costs without gaining anything in exchange, merely in the delusional hope that Russia might then be grateful enough to sacrifice what it views as its own strategic interests for our benefit, is sheer folly.

But then, what else would you expect from a government that has built its foreign policy largely on the hope that throwing steaks to tigers will eventually turn them into vegetarians?

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Why Israel Needs a Better Political Class

Note: This piece is a response to an essay by Haviv Rettig Gur, which can be found here

Israel’s current political crisis exemplifies the maxim that hard cases make bad law. This case is desperate. Six months after the coronavirus erupted and nine months after the fiscal year began, Israel still lacks both a functioning contact-tracing system and an approved 2020 budget, mainly because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is more worried about politics than the domestic problems that Israel now confronts. The government’s failure to perform these basic tasks obviously invites the conclusion that civil servants’ far-reaching powers must not only be preserved, but perhaps even increased.

This would be the wrong conclusion. Bureaucrats, especially when they have great power, are vulnerable to the same ills as elected politicians. But unlike politicians, they are completely unaccountable to the public.

That doesn’t mean Haviv Rettig Gur is wrong to deem them indispensable. They provide institutional memory, flesh out elected officials’ policies, and supply information the politicians may not know and options they may not have considered. Yet the current crisis shows in several ways why they neither can nor should substitute for elected politicians.

First, bureaucrats are no less prone to poor judgment than politicians. As evidence, consider Siegal Sadetzki, part of the Netanyahu-led triumvirate that ran Israel’s initial response to the coronavirus. It’s unsurprising that Gur never mentioned Sadetzki even as he lauded the triumvirate’s third member, former Health Ministry Director General Moshe Bar Siman-Tov; she and her fellow Health Ministry staffers are a major reason why Israel still lacks a functional test-and-trace system.

Sadetzki, an epidemiologist, was the ministry’s director of public-health services and the only member of the triumvirate with professional expertise in epidemics (Bar Siman-Tov is an economist). As such, her input was crucial. Yet she adamantly opposed expanding virus testing, even publicly asserting that “Too much testing will increase complacence.” She opposed letting organizations outside the public-health system do lab work for coronavirus tests, even though the system was overwhelmed. She opposed sewage monitoring to track the spread of the virus. And on, and on.

Moreover, even after acknowledging that test-and-trace was necessary, ministry bureaucrats insisted for months that their ministry do the tracing despite its glaringly inadequate manpower. Only in August was the job finally given to the army, which does have the requisite personnel. And the system still isn’t fully operational.

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