Analysis from Israel

You know a theory is becoming accepted wisdom when it’s spouted by everyone from the editorial board of Israel’s far-left daily Haaretz to the highly intelligent American foreign policy scholar Walter Russell Mead. The theory in question holds that ruling Gaza, and the consequent need to ensure the welfare of its residents, has forced Hamas to moderate to the extent of being ripe for pragmatic agreements with Israel on this subject. Specifically, argue Mead and Haaretz, Hamas has an interest in further easing Israel’s blockade of Gaza, and its ability to conclude the Shalit deal -under which Israel traded 1,027 Palestinian terrorists for one kidnapped soldier – proves it can negotiate other mutually beneficial deals with Israel as well.

If this theory of Hamas’ pragmatism is correct, it obviously has important implications for other Islamist parties that have won, or are poised to win, elections in the Arab Spring countries, first and foremost Egypt. So it’s worth reading what Gershon Baskin, who played a key role in brokering the Shalit deal, has to say on the subject:

In the early days of the official negotiations I was asked to inform Hamas that once Shalit was no longer in Gaza Israel would allow major economic development and infrastructure projects to be implemented there. Some in Israel believed this could serve as an incentive to the Hamas leaders to advance the deal. It was not. To the contrary: that proposal was essentially ignored. At no point in those talks did my Hamas interlocutors express any real interest in pursuing that discussion. My hunch – that economic issues would not excite Hamas leaders to make compromises – proved to be correct.

In other words, Hamas couldn’t care less about improving ordinary Palestinians’ lives by easing the blockade of Gaza. Indeed, it was so indifferent to this goal it completely ignored an Israeli offer to do so. Instead, it focused solely on trying to get Israel to release the maximum number of the most murderous terrorists it possibly could -for instance, the men who orchestrated deadly suicide bombings on a Passover seder in Netanya, a Jerusalem pizzeria and buses in Jerusalem and Haifa (those four attacks alone killed 73 Israelis). In short, faced with a choice between improving its people’s lives and improving its ability to murder Israelis by freeing the most accomplished killers, it unhesitatingly chose the latter.

Nor is there any shortage of other evidence regarding Hamas’ utter indifference to its people’s welfare. It has barred aid shipments from entering Gaza; it banned Israeli imports after Israel eased the blockade last year, hence ensuring Gaza remained deprived; it shut down Gaza’s major power plant rather than pay for the fuel; it barred high school students from using the scholarships they won for study abroad; and the list could go on and on.

Hence, the idea Hamas will suddenly decide to change course and cooperate with Israel on easing the blockade is ludicrous. And the idea other Islamist governments will moderate once they gain power is liable to prove equally so.

 

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Why Israel Needs a Better Political Class

Note: This piece is a response to an essay by Haviv Rettig Gur, which can be found here

Israel’s current political crisis exemplifies the maxim that hard cases make bad law. This case is desperate. Six months after the coronavirus erupted and nine months after the fiscal year began, Israel still lacks both a functioning contact-tracing system and an approved 2020 budget, mainly because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is more worried about politics than the domestic problems that Israel now confronts. The government’s failure to perform these basic tasks obviously invites the conclusion that civil servants’ far-reaching powers must not only be preserved, but perhaps even increased.

This would be the wrong conclusion. Bureaucrats, especially when they have great power, are vulnerable to the same ills as elected politicians. But unlike politicians, they are completely unaccountable to the public.

That doesn’t mean Haviv Rettig Gur is wrong to deem them indispensable. They provide institutional memory, flesh out elected officials’ policies, and supply information the politicians may not know and options they may not have considered. Yet the current crisis shows in several ways why they neither can nor should substitute for elected politicians.

First, bureaucrats are no less prone to poor judgment than politicians. As evidence, consider Siegal Sadetzki, part of the Netanyahu-led triumvirate that ran Israel’s initial response to the coronavirus. It’s unsurprising that Gur never mentioned Sadetzki even as he lauded the triumvirate’s third member, former Health Ministry Director General Moshe Bar Siman-Tov; she and her fellow Health Ministry staffers are a major reason why Israel still lacks a functional test-and-trace system.

Sadetzki, an epidemiologist, was the ministry’s director of public-health services and the only member of the triumvirate with professional expertise in epidemics (Bar Siman-Tov is an economist). As such, her input was crucial. Yet she adamantly opposed expanding virus testing, even publicly asserting that “Too much testing will increase complacence.” She opposed letting organizations outside the public-health system do lab work for coronavirus tests, even though the system was overwhelmed. She opposed sewage monitoring to track the spread of the virus. And on, and on.

Moreover, even after acknowledging that test-and-trace was necessary, ministry bureaucrats insisted for months that their ministry do the tracing despite its glaringly inadequate manpower. Only in August was the job finally given to the army, which does have the requisite personnel. And the system still isn’t fully operational.

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