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One of the most disturbing of many disturbing developments in the Middle East recently is the growing fear among America’s traditional Arab allies that Washington’s support can no longer be relied on.
Whether this fear has any valid basis is irrelevant. Last month, for instance, Reuters reported on two different conspiracy theories that are gaining currency among the Gulf states’ leadership: that America is plotting with the Muslim Brotherhood to replace existing Arab monarchies, and that it wants to create a Shi’ite-led government in Bahrain as a step toward rapprochement with Iran. Needless to say, both are nonsensical. But even if one deems the premise delusional, the consequences are very real – and highly detrimental to American interests.
America’s Arab allies have always relied on a U.S. defense umbrella for protection against outside threats, from Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 to Iran today. In exchange, they keep oil markets relatively stable (Saudi Arabia, for instance, boosted oil production to compensate for the shortfall caused by sanctions on Iran), cooperate closely on counterterrorism activity against anti-American groups like al Qaeda (even as they remain largely responsible for financing the spread of the extremist Islamic ideology that fosters such terrorism), avoid destabilizing military activity, and occasionally support other American policy goals (for instance, Saudi Arabia’s grand mufti publicly denounced the attacks on America’s consulate in Benghazi and embassy in Cairo as un-Islamic).
But the moment they think this American defense umbrella can’t be relied on, their willingness to support American interests will vanish. At that point, they will either begin cozying up to powerful neighbors like Iran, engage in military adventurism of their own, or start funding anti-American terrorist groups rather than fighting them.
As former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations Dr. Dore Gold noted recently, Qatar was a bellwether in this regard: According to senior Gulf state officials, the U.S. government’s 2007 National Intelligence Estimate’s finding that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 made Qatar doubt America’s resolve to prevent Iran’s nuclearization, so it began moving closer to Tehran. By 2010, it was openly planning joint military exercises with Iran, even while continuing to host America’s main airbase in the region. Indeed, the shift was so marked that other Gulf States began excluding it from meetings called to discuss concerns about Iran. Only thanks to Syria’s civil war did this trend reverse: As a Sunni state, Qatar couldn’t risk appearing to countenance the Iranian-backed Assad regime’s slaughter of the Sunni-led opposition.
Over the past two years, however, there have been worrying signs that other Arab countries are also beginning to disregard American concerns. Iraq, for instance, defied repeated U.S. demands to bar Iran from flying weapons to Syria through its airspace, even though America is its main arms supplier. Yet seen through the prism of fear, it could hardly do otherwise: Bordered by Iran and its powerful army, lacking even an air force of its own, it can’t risk antagonizing Tehran if it isn’t certain America will be there to protect it.
Perhaps the most noteworthy example was Saudi Arabia’s decision to send troops into Bahrain last year without even warning Washington, thereby destroying America’s hopes for a negotiated solution between Bahrain’s Sunni government and the Shi’ite-led opposition. Saudi Arabia is not only one of America’s closest Arab allies, it has traditionally been averse to employing military force outside its borders. Yet without confidence that Washington would keep the Iranian wolf from its door, Riyadh felt it had no choice. “We don’t want Iran 14 miles off our coast, and that’s not going to happen,” a senior Saudi official bluntly told The Washington Post. Having lived with Iranian-backed militias on two of their borders for years, Israelis can sympathize.
So far, these are minor annoyances rather than major strategic setbacks. But if this trend continues, the costs are liable to escalate.
For all these states, as cables published by WikiLeaks in 2010 made clear, the make-or-break issue is Iran’s nuclear program. Saudi Arabia urged the U.S. to attack Iran and “cut off the head of the snake.” Abu Dhabi’s crown prince warned, “[Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad is Hitler.” King Hamad of Bahrain said Iran’s nuclear program “must be stopped,” because “the danger of letting it go on is greater than the danger of stopping it.” Former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri declared that the Iraq war “was unnecessary,” but “Iran is necessary.” A senior Jordanian official said that military action against Iran would be “catastrophic,” but he “nonetheless thought preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would pay enough dividends to make it worth the risks.”
All these countries would be delighted if sanctions and diplomacy did the trick instead. But they want Iran’s nuclear program stopped, whatever it takes – and they want to be convinced that America will see to it.
Clearly, America can’t sacrifice its own strategic interests just to reassure its Arab allies on this point. For instance, many of these allies believe the Assad regime’s downfall would deal Iran a major blow, so they want Washington to at least let them provide the Syrian opposition with heavier weapons (as their main arms supplier, America has an effective veto), and perhaps even impose a no-fly zone. But if Washington believes America’s own strategic interests argue against these moves, it obviously can’t acquiesce simply to convince its allies that it’s serious about stopping Iran.
Yet since a bipartisan consensus in Washington holds that Iran’s nuclear program must indeed be stopped, finding some way to convey the necessary reassurance without undermining American interests shouldn’t be impossible. And doing so is vital.
Many Americans are understandably weary of American involvement in the Middle East, but the region is still too important to be ignored. Reassuring America’s Arab allies should therefore be a priority for whoever wins next month’s presidential election.
Last month, two Israeli high-school students were among the eight winners of a prestigious international physics competition, First Step to Nobel Prize in Physics. In addition to accounting for a quarter of the winners, Israelis won 12 honorable mentions, more than double the number won by any other country. And to top it off, 12 of Israel’s 14 budding physics stars came from disadvantaged southern towns like Kiryat Gat and Netivot, which normally place well down the educational rankings.
I wish the above were the prelude to a groveling apology for having repeatedly maligned Israel’s public education system as “failing.” Unfortunately, the public education system had nothing to do with these stunning results; the credit belongs almost entirely to an extracurricular program run by Ben-Gurion University’s Ilan Ramon Youth Physics Center – which is why southern students featured so prominently. The center, founded in 2007, has produced a steady stream of Israeli achievements at the competition in recent years.
Thus what these results actually show is just how much potential our failing school system is wasting – and why improving it ought to be a top priority for whatever new government is elected in January.
Of course, saying that is easy; the tough part is figuring out how. In an editorial last week, The Jerusalem Post urged the adoption of recommendations prepared by the international consulting firm McKinsey & Company, which focus on improving teacher quality. That’s clearly essential; it’s hard to provide serious math education, for instance, when 42 percent of high school math teachers lack college degrees in math or any related subject. But it’s equally clearly a long-term project.
There is, however, something schools can do that produces almost immediate results, as one failing New York public school recently discovered: invest serious time and energy, rather than mere lip service, in teaching kids to write.
An article published in this month’s Atlantic magazine tells the story of the New Dorp public school. For years, New Dorp tried all the accepted methods for turning itself around: It fired bad teachers; it solicited grant money that led it to reduce class sizes and offer after-school enrichment programs. But nothing worked.
When principal Deirdre DeAngelis sought to find out why, her investigation led her to a stunning conclusion: The one thing that consistently distinguished successful from failing students was that the former could express themselves in writing and the latter couldn’t. In fact, the failing students didn’t even know how to use simple connecting words like “and,” “but” “although” or “despite” to combine simple ideas into more complex ones.
One of my best high school teachers used to say that your ability to think is limited by your vocabulary: You can’t even think a thought if you lack the words to express it. That, essentially, was what DeAngelis discovered about her students: Because they lacked the tools to express complex ideas, they also lacked the tools to understand them.
She therefore got an expert to show her teachers how to teach writing. Then New Dorp began teaching its students. First, they were drilled in basic grammar, learning how to use crucial connecting words like “although.” Then they were made to practice – relentlessly.
Writing became part of the curriculum in every subject except math. Even in chemistry class, students were assigned to produce complex sentences describing the concepts they had learned (like “Although hydrogen is explosive and oxygen supports combustion, a compound of them puts out fires.”)
Later, they were taught how to combine such sentences into paragraphs, then expository essays, so as to convey complex ideas. Essentially, New Dorp scrapped the prevailing American educational theory, which held that students learn writing best through fun, creative assignments. Now, instead of assignments like “Write a postcard to a friend describing life in the trenches of World War I,” students had to write essays describing three major causes of the war.
The results were dramatic. Between 2009 and 2011, the proportion of students who passed New York’s statewide Regents exams shot up from 67 to 89 percent in English and from 64 to 75 percent in history. The number of students put in remedial courses after failing the exams the first time fell from 175 to 40. And the number taking college-level courses rose from 148 in 2006 to 412 in 2011.
The implications for Israel should be obvious. Though Israeli students are taught grammar, they are required to do very little writing. And like any skill, writing can’t be learned without practice. The result, as university presidents have been warning for years, is that students enter college with very poor writing skills.
They also enter with poor skills in many other areas – as is clear not only from the laments of university presidents, but also from the results of the triannual PISA exam: On the 2009 exam (the 2012 results aren’t available yet), Israel ranked 36th out of 64 countries in reading and 41st in science and math. Yet as New Dorp’s experience shows, teaching kids to write can also improve their learning skills in general.
Obviously, better math and science education are also essential: From the shortage of trained teachers to problems with curricula (the sharp drop in eighth-grade math scores on last year’s nationwide Meitzav achievement tests, for instance, has prompted the Education Ministry to investigate whether its new middle-school math curriculum isn’t making things worse rather than better), Israeli schools face serious problems in math and science education that must be addressed.
But doing so will require both time and money: Not only is it impossible to recruit thousands of qualified teachers overnight, but persuading people with top-notch math and science skills to choose teaching over high-tech will require narrowing the enormous salary gap between these professions. In contrast, a serious writing program can be introduced quickly and cheaply, and it demonstrably produces quick results.
A beefed-up writing program would thus be an excellent way to start improving the education system. And it would even be politically smart – because nothing would make parents more likely to reelect a government than seeing their children’s achievements at school demonstrably improve.
The writer is a journalist and commentator.
Five men were arrested over the Succot holiday for the “crime” of trying to pray at Judaism’s holiest site. Regardless of their guilt or innocence (some deny the charge), the fact that these arrests elicited so little outrage shows that something is terribly wrong in Israel. After all, one of the state’s raisons d’etre was to provide Jews with the basic freedoms and protections other countries so often denied them. Yet here is the state itself depriving Jews of a fundamental freedom, and few even seem to care.
As Rabbi Yuval Cherlow pointed out recently, denying Jews the right to pray at their holiest site grossly violates their freedom of religion, making the silence of our “human rights” organizations unconscionable. “Anyone who doesn’t fight for freedom of worship on Temple Mount,” he correctly noted, “is not a true advocate of human rights.”
No less hypocritical is the silence of our self-styled defenders of “the rule of law.” In 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that “Jewish prayer should not be prevented unless there is concrete information about actual danger to [human] life” or the worshipers’ safety. Yet despite the security quiet of the past six years, police have consistently barred Jewish prayer on the Mount, in gross violation of this ruling.
Still, hypocrisy by human rights organizations and “rule of law” advocates is nothing new. What is truly disturbing is the inertia of our elected representatives – the people whose job it is to ensure that the Jewish state fulfills its purpose.
Two justifications are usually cited for the prayer ban. One is that halakha (Jewish law) itself bars Jews from worshiping on the Mount, so the ban doesn’t actually infringe on Jewish freedom of worship. The other is that allowing Jewish worship would spark Arab riots, because Muslims consider the Mount their exclusive preserve. Neither holds water.
The first did have some validity when the ban was first imposed, immediately after Jerusalem’s reunification in 1967: Back then, rabbinical authorities almost unanimously agreed that halakha forbids Jews even to set foot on the Mount. But while haredi rabbis still maintain this view, most religious Zionist rabbis now consider it possible to distinguish the halakhically forbidden parts of the Mount from those that aren’t. Consequently, they not only permit ascending the Mount, but actively encourage it: In October 2009, for instance, leading religious Zionist rabbis publicly said Jews should go there frequently and in large numbers.
The religious public, incidentally, appears to be ahead of its leadership on this issue: A recent poll showed that fully 92 percent of religious Jews favor allowing Jewish worship on the Mount – as do 52 percent of Israeli Jews overall.
The security argument, in contrast, was always specious, as proven by the success with which Jews and Muslims share another holy site: the Cave of the Patriarchs (Machpela) in Hebron. On most days, part of the cave functions as a mosque and part as a synagogue, while on Jewish and Muslim holidays, the cave is open only to members of the celebrating religion. The arrangement hasn’t been tension-free, but it has held for 45 years now – and far from sparking Arab unrest, Muslim riots actually occur far less frequently at Machpela than they do on the Mount.
Nor is this coincidental: It’s precisely because of Israel’s commitment to keeping Machpela open to Jews that Muslim riots are less common there. At Machpela, rioting would be counterproductive: Israel would more likely respond by closing the cave to Muslims than to Jews. But on the Mount, rioting pays off handsomely: Instead of closing the site to Muslims, Israel invariably responds by “temporarily” closing it to Jews. And “temporarily” is an elastic term: After the intifada erupted in September 2000, for instance, the Mount was “temporarily” closed to Jews for the next three years.
Thus while allowing Jewish worship on the Mount probably would spark Muslim outbursts at first, a consistent policy of penalizing Arabs rather than Jews for Arab rioting – instead of the current policy of penalizing Jews – would soon make such rioting as rare as it is at Machpela. Spontaneous riots might still occur occasionally, but many riots on the Mount are deliberately incited by political and religious leaders seeking to bolster Muslim control of the site. Once these leaders are convinced that rioting will undermine this goal rather than serving it, nonspontaneous riots will stop.
Indeed, sharing the Mount is actually easier than sharing Machpela, because Jews and Muslims aren’t seeking to pray in the very same spot: Both Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock are located in areas that all halakhic authorities deem off-limits to Jews.
Permitting Jewish worship on the Mount would also serve Israel’s diplomatic interests. By banning Jewish prayer, Israel has convinced the world that the Mount is far more religiously important to Muslims than to Jews, though in reality, it is Judaism’s holiest site, and only Islam’s third holiest. This misconception badly undermines Israel’s ability to muster international support for keeping Jerusalem united.
Yet this consideration, weighty though it is, pales beside the basic fact that banning Jewish worship on the Mount is a betrayal of everything the Jewish State is supposed to be. Two weeks ago, discussing another shocking incident, Robert Horenstein wrote in these pages that “The nation-state of the Jewish people cannot be a place where one of its citizens can be taken into custody for carrying a Torah.” I agree. But the nation-state of the Jewish people also can’t be a place where Jews are arrested for praying at Judaism’s holiest site.
In August, coalition chairman MK Zeev Elkin publicly declared that Israel should institute a shared-worship model on the Mount like the one at Machpela. That’s encouraging, but so far, he hasn’t translated his words into action. The only MK who has submitted legislation on the issue is opposition member Aryeh Eldad (National Union).
Even the US State Department now acknowledges that banning Jewish worship on the Mount violates religious freedom. It’s long past time for the Knesset to do the same – and to finally end this disgrace by enacting appropriate legislation.
The writer is a journalist and commentator.
Two recent news items tell you almost everything you need to know about the Gaza Strip, but usually won’t hear. First, the new iPhone 5 – which isn’t even available in Israel yet – is selling like hotcakes in Gaza, despite prices ranging from $1,170 to $1,480, roughly double what they are in the U.S. This, you’ll recall, is the same Gaza that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon characterized in an address to the UN Human Rights Council last month as suffering “unremitting poverty” due to Israel’s “harsh” blockade, a humanitarian crisis so grave that he devoted more of his speech to Gaza and the Palestinians than he did to the slaughter in Syria, where the death toll is over 30,000 and rising daily. It’s also the same Gaza that a UN report in August said would be “unlivable” by 2020 if the blockade continued.
Second, Palestinian doctors recently opened a cystic fibrosis clinic in Gaza that now treats 80 Palestinian children – thanks to Israel. The story began a few years ago, when an Israeli doctor, Eitan Kerem, saw a Palestinian cri de coeur on the Internet: After Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, it began strongly discouraging Gazans from seeking treatment in nearby Israel, sending them instead to Egyptian clinics located much farther away, and cystic fibrosis patients were finding the 24-hour journey unbearable. Kerem promptly joined forces with an Israeli nonprofit to organize a program to train Gazan specialists at Israel’s Hadassah Hospital, thereby enabling them to start treating cystic fibrosis patients in Gaza instead.
The first obvious lesson of these stories is that Gaza’s “humanitarian crisis” is a fiction propagated by UN bureaucrats, “human rights” organizations and complicit journalists.
As former senior Palestinian Authority official Mohammed Dahlan noted in August, many people worldwide would be delighted to have such a “humanitarian crisis”: He quoted a Sudanese minister who visited the Strip recently as saying he wished Sudan was as well-provided with staple products as Gaza was.
The second is that Gaza’s real problems are generally caused not by Israel, but by its own rulers – as with the cystic fibrosis patients forced to endure those exhausting journeys to Egypt for treatment. Or Hamas’s decision last month to bar imports of seven types of fruit from Israel, which sent prices soaring – to the obvious detriment of Gazan consumers. Or its decision to bar Israeli firms from building a UNICEF-funded desalination plant thereby perpetuates the lack of clean drinking water that the UN report deemed Gaza’s gravest problem. Indeed, as the cystic fibrosis tale shows, Israel often steps in to try to alleviate the distress Hamas causes.
Finally, of course, there’s the most significant decision of all: Hamas’s refusal to end the nonstop rocket fire at Israel, which is why the blockade exists to begin with. In a press conference marking the release of the UN’s August report on Gaza, UN humanitarian coordinator Maxwell Gaylard declared that “Despite their best efforts, the Palestinians in Gaza still need help … both politically and practically.” Evidently, Gaylard and his fellow UN bureaucrats consider it unreasonable to expect Palestinians’ “best efforts” to help themselves to include ending the rocket fire.
As Israeli Ambassador to the UN Ron Prosor said in August, the truth is “plain and simple: Hamas is responsible for the suffering in Gaza.” All the UN verbiage is aimed solely at concealing this fact.
UNESCO director Irina Bokova griped publicly last week about how much her organization is suffering from the U.S. funding cutoff sparked by its admission of “Palestine” last year. That provides Washington with real leverage to foil the Palestinian Authority’s planned bid for UN General Assembly recognition as a nonmember observer state later this fall. Incredibly, however, the administration doesn’t seem to be making use of it.
It ought to be clear that thwarting the PA’s bid is an American interest. First, as Washington itself acknowledged in a memo to European countries reported by The Guardian two weeks ago, it would have “significant negative consequences” for the peace process, to which America officially remains committed. Second, PA President Mahmoud Abbas has said explicitly that he wants recognition mainly so he can “pursue claims against Israel” in various legal forums, including the International Criminal Court – which in April declined to indict Israel for “war crimes” in Gaza solely on the technical grounds that the UNGA hadn’t yet recognized “Palestine” as a state. But an ICC case against Israel over Gaza, as I explain here, would significantly increase the risk that American officers could someday face ICC indictments as well.
In its memo, Washington warned that the UNGA bid would threaten U.S. funding to the PA. That may have some impact on already cash-strapped European countries, some of whom, as The Guardian reported, are worried “that the EU would have to fill the funding gap.” But since various European countries have happily stepped into the breach during past PA funding crises, it’s hard to see this as a winning argument even for the EU. And it certainly won’t trouble that vast majority of UNGA members who don’t give the Palestinians a dime.
In contrast, just about every country likely to vote in favor of recognizing “Palestine” has an interest in preserving the UNGA. For most, this is because the General Assembly is a much more effective vehicle for pursuing their own interests than the Security Council, where the U.S. and other permanent members have veto power. But even Europe, which wields significant clout in the Security Council, cares about the UNGA’s continued ability to function, due to its intense emotional commitment to the sanctity of international organizations. Hence a threat that accepting “Palestine” would result in the General Assembly losing its U.S. funding – which amounts to 22 percent of the agency’s budget – could be much more effective.
Yet so far, Washington has declined to make this threat explicitly. One ambiguous sentence in its memo – that recognizing Palestine “would have significant negative consequences … for the UN system,” could be interpreted as an implicit threat to suspend funding, but it could equally well be interpreted as warning of some more intangible harm, such as damage to the UN’s image, or to its ability to facilitate the peace process.
This issue ought to be a no-brainer: Washington has a clear interest in preventing the UNGA from recognizing “Palestine,” and it also has the tools to do so. The only question is whether it also has the will.
If I could ask every cabinet minister to read one thing now that the
holidays are over and they are getting back to business, it wouldn’t be a
great classic or a scholarly tome. It would be an 800-word
href=”http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/obama-vs-netanyahu-7515?page=1″
target=”_blank”>journal article by a PhD student arguing
that regardless of who wins November’s US presidential election, there’s
no chance America will ever take military action against Iran’s nuclear
program.
Other pundits have advanced this claim
href=”http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/109873/why-romney-wont-strike-iran”
target=”_blank”>before, often persuasively. But what makes
Gabriel Scheinmann’s piece in The National Interest unique is that he doesn’t
ground it in either domestic or foreign-policy considerations, which
could theoretically change. Rather, he points to a consistent,
half-century-old policy tradition in which successive US governments,
both Democratic and Republican, have repeatedly considered preemptive
military action against nuclear programs, and always decided against it –
from the Soviet Union in the 1950s through China in the 1960s all the
way to Syria in 2007.
Scheinmann doesn’t detail why successive governments rejected military
action, but the reasons are fairly obvious: Most of the same arguments –
from reluctance to be seen as the aggressor through belief in the
feasibility of containment to fear of sparking a war – are made today by
opponents of military action against Iran. But there’s another, even
more important reason that often goes unspoken: America is a superpower.
Hence even another nuclear superpower like the USSR doesn’t necessarily
pose an existential threat to it. And a mere regional power like Iran
certainly doesn’t.
This doesn’t mean a
nuclear-armed Iran couldn’t cause America plenty of pain; it could. But
pain isn’t an existential threat. The USSR also caused America plenty of
pain, including hundreds of thousands of soldiers killed or wounded in
several conventional wars against Soviet-backed forces. Yet overall,
America still flourished during that half-century of conflict.
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For a tiny country like Israel, in contrast, a nuclear
Iran is an existential threat. This isn’t merely because a single
nuclear bomb could wipe out much of the country; it’s also because
Israel is so badly outnumbered by hostile neighbors’ conventional
forces.
Click here to view the full article, accessible to Premium Zone subscribers.
If I could ask every cabinet minister to read one thing now that the holidays are over and they are getting back to business, it wouldn’t be a great classic or a scholarly tome. It would be an 800-word journal article by a PhD student arguing that regardless of who wins November’s US presidential election, there’s no chance America will ever take military action against Iran’s nuclear program.
Other pundits have advanced this claim before, often persuasively. But what makes Gabriel Scheinmann’s piece in The National Interest unique is that he doesn’t ground it in either domestic or foreign-policy considerations, which could theoretically change. Rather, he points to a consistent, half-century-old policy tradition in which successive US governments, both Democratic and Republican, have repeatedly considered preemptive military action against nuclear programs, and always decided against it – from the Soviet Union in the 1950s through China in the 1960s all the way to Syria in 2007.
Indeed, as another article published recently by the Washington Institute reveals, US governments have sometimes gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid having to take action: In the 1980s, for instance, Washington knew Pakistan “was producing all the parts for a nuclear weapon–indeed, for several such weapons–and almost entirely assembling them. Yet because the last screw had not been tightened in Pakistan’s case, the US government certified to Congress each year that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapon.”
Scheinmann doesn’t detail why successive governments rejected military action, but the reasons are fairly obvious: Most of the same arguments – from reluctance to be seen as the aggressor through belief in the feasibility of containment to fear of sparking a war – are made today by opponents of military action against Iran. But there’s another, even more important reason that often goes unspoken: America is a superpower. Hence even another nuclear superpower like the USSR doesn’t necessarily pose an existential threat to it. And a mere regional power like Iran certainly doesn’t.
This doesn’t mean a nuclear-armed Iran couldn’t cause America plenty of pain; it could. But pain isn’t an existential threat. The USSR also caused America plenty of pain, including hundreds of thousands of soldiers killed or wounded in several conventional wars against Soviet-backed forces. Yet overall, America still flourished during that half-century of conflict.
For a tiny country like Israel, in contrast, a nuclear Iran is an existential threat. This isn’t merely because a single nuclear bomb could wipe out much of the country; it’s also because Israel is so badly outnumbered by hostile neighbors’ conventional forces. Indeed, as former Israeli ambassador Dore Gold noted last month, tape recordings seized by US forces during the Iraq War show that this was a major impetus behind Saddam Hussein’s desire for nuclear weapons: On several occasions, he told senior aides that once Israel’s putative nukes had been neutralized by the threat of mutual assured destruction, Iraq and its allies would be able to destroy the Zionist entity in a conventional war.
Why does all this matter? Because one major reason why so many Israeli ministers and defense officials oppose an Israeli attack on Iran is their hope that eventually, once it’s clear time is running out, Washington will make good on its oft-repeated pledge to keep Iran from acquiring nukes by launching military action of its own.
There’s virtually no disagreement among Israel’s leadership that if the only choices are Israeli military action or a nuclear Iran, the former is preferable. But there’s also virtually no disagreement that American military action is preferable to either. America’s vastly more powerful military can do much more damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities than Israel’s can, while its superpower status means that afterward, it is both far less likely to suffer international penalties and far more likely to be able to mobilize international pressure to keep Iran from reconstituting its nuclear program. Hence if American military action is in the cards, it makes sense for Israel to eschew military action of its own.
But if American military action isn’t going to happen, then Israel has nothing to gain, and a great deal to lose, by postponing its own strike: Iran will exploit every extra day it is given to expand its nuclear program and fortify it against attack, so the more time passes, the less damage an Israeli strike will be able to inflict – and therefore, the less it will delay Iran’s pursuit of the bomb. And since delay is pointless unless it buys enough time for some more permanent solution – whether an internal uprising that overthrows the mullahs’ regime, an Iranian overreaction that prompts an America military response, or sanctions crippling enough to actually force Iran to abandon its nuclear program (something the current sanctions, for all the pain they are causing, as yet show no sign of doing) – less delay means less chance of ultimate success.
Obviously, there could still be other valid reasons for postponing Israeli action: If, for instance, waiting until after the US elections would significantly increase either the likelihood or the magnitude of American support for Israel after the strike, the benefits might outweigh the costs. But postponing an Israeli strike in the hope that America will attack instead would be the height of irresponsibility, because the chances of that are virtually nonexistent.
In a rare moment of candor, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey recently acknowledged that Iran’s nuclear program worries Israel more than it does America because Israelis “are living with an existential concern that we are not living with.” That’s the crucial point Israelis must keep in mind, because that’s why American military action is ultimately unlikely.
It’s no accident that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli politician most knowledgeable about America, is also the strongest supporter of Israeli military action against Iran: Unlike his fellows, he realizes just how unlikely American action is. But it’s past time for the rest of Israel’s decision makers to face up to this unpleasant fact as well. If military action is needed to keep Iran from getting nukes, Israel will have to launch the strike itself.
The writer is a journalist and commentator.
The consequences for peace talks are obvious. If the General Assembly accedes to Abbas’s request to recognize “Palestine” in the 1967 lines, no Palestinian leader will be able to accept less. Yet no Israeli leader could agree to this. Aside from Israel’s longstanding security objections to the ” Auschwitz lines,” hundreds of thousands of Israelis live in East Jerusalem and the major settlement blocs; evicting that many citizens from their homes would be politically impossible.
Even if one assumes the 1967 lines would merely be the starting point for negotiations, UN recognition would hinder the talks. Contrary to the widespread view that borders are an easily resolved issue, negotiations have consistently foundered over them. Even Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who offered Abbas the equivalent of the 1967 lines in 2008, sought land swaps for about seven percent of the West Bank to avoid evicting hundreds of thousands of Israelis. Yet Abbas has consistently offered only about two percent. And he’s unlikely to be more forthcoming once the UN has endorsed his position.
Moreover, such recognition would reduce Palestinian willingness to agree to necessary concessions on other issues, like security and refugees, since Israel’s main bargaining chip is the territory it controls. Thus once the UN has already awarded the Palestinians 100 percent of this territory, what could Israel offer in exchange for concessions on other issues?
But while the threat UN recognition poses to peace talks is clear, the threat to American military personnel may seem less obvious. Though Abbas openly admits to wanting UN recognition primarily so he can file charges against Israel in the ICC, media reports often imply that Israel’s main concern is an indictment over the settlements – an issue irrelevant to the U.S. military.
Yet the one issue over which Abbas has actually sought to indict Israel isn’t the settlements, but its war with Hamas in Gaza in January 2009. The ICC rejected that request, but only because the PA wasn’t a state, and therefore lacked standing to join the court: It explicitly said it could reconsider should the General Assembly recognize “Palestine” as a nonmember state.
The PA’s case rests on the infamous Goldstone Report, which accused Israel of war crimes in Gaza and recommended that these findings be submitted to the ICC prosecutor for consideration. Both the UN Human Rights Council and the General Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed the report (though even its author has since disavowed it).
But there’s virtually nothing Israel did in Gaza that the United States and some of its European allies haven’t done in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. For instance, the Goldstone Report assailed Israel for having caused civilian casualties, ignoring the difficulties of avoiding such casualties when fighting terrorists who wear no uniforms and deliberately launch attacks from civilian population centers. Thousands of civilians have been killed under similar circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus if Israel could be indicted for this, so could America.
Or take the houses Israel destroyed due to fear they were booby-trapped: The United States has demolished hundreds of houses in Afghanistan for the same reason.
But an ICC indictment against Israel over Gaza isn’t just a precedent that could be used against America. Rather, it’s an essential precondition for indicting America.
Like all new institutions, the ICC must expand its reach cautiously to avoid a backlash. And smart institutions accomplish this by beginning with “easy” targets, then using the precedents set in those cases to tackle harder ones.
Israel is unquestionably the West’s easiest target: Far from provoking an international backlash, indicting it would win the ICC global applause – including in Europe, where only eight countries voted against the Goldstone Report. But once the court indicts Israel over Gaza, it will have no grounds for refusing to indict the United States or one of its allies for identical actions in Iraq or Afghanistan, or any other country where, say, U.S. drone strikes have killed civilians (such as Pakistan). After all, Israel tries just as hard as they do to avoid civilian casualties, as attested by no less a personage than the former commander of British forces in Afghanistan.
Thus all it would take would be for one such country to join the court (if it hasn’t already) and file a complaint. An indictment would then require all 121 existing member states – including many American allies – to arrest any defendants that enter their territory.
Clearly, this doesn’t mean every private in the field would be at risk; war crimes charges generally target the senior officers and government officials who devise the allegedly “illegal” tactics and issue the orders, rather than the lower-ranking soldiers who carry them out. That is how the ICC has acted to date, and it’s equally true of cases Palestinians have hitherto pursued in European countries with universal jurisdiction laws. When a Spanish judge agreed to investigate the 2002 airstrike in Gaza that killed leading Hamas terrorist Salah Shehadeh, for instance, the Israelis named as suspects included the defense minister, the Israel Defense Forces chief of staff, the air force commander, and the Shin Bet security service chief. Israelis who have canceled visits to Britain because of arrest warrants sought by Palestinian groups include a former foreign minister, the IDF chief of staff, the commander of the IDF’s Southern Command, and the Shin Bet security service chief.
Giving the PA the status necessary to seek an ICC indictment of senior Israeli officers over Gaza thus greatly increases the risk that American officers, too, could someday find themselves in the ICC’s dock. Therefore, Washington has a vested interest in preventing it.
Fortunately, it also has the leverage to do so. It could threaten Abbas with an aid cutoff if he goes through with his bid, and lobby other PA donors to follow suit. Even more important, it could warn both the UN and member states that should the UNGA approve Abbas’s request, it will forfeit Washington’s 22 percent share of its budget.
Just how effective this latter threat can be is evident from the aftermath of UNESCO’s admission of “Palestine” last year. Initially, Abbas planned to follow up by applying to join other UN agencies. But after Washington canceled its 22 percent contribution to UNESCO’s budget, both UN officials and other countries pressured him to drop the idea, because they didn’t want other agencies’ budgets similarly gutted. And he did.
In short, America both can and should thwart the PA’s UN bid – not only because of its stated commitment to Israeli-Palestinian peace, but for the sake of its own men and women in uniform.
On September 5, a former president of Germany’s Central Council of Jews published an op-ed in a leading German paper that demanded, “Do you still want us Jews?”
“For 60 years I have defended Germany as a survivor of the Shoah. Now I ask myself if that was right,” wrote Charlotte Knobloch, responding to a German court’s ruling that circumcision was illegal and a subsequent criminal complaint against a rabbi for performing circumcisions. Charging that people who know nothing about Judaism “now want to tell us whether and how we can follow our religion,” she said that for six decades, she defended her decision to stay in Germany after the Holocaust “because I was firmly convinced that this country and these people deserved it. For the first time my basic convictions are starting to shake … I seriously ask if this country still wants us.”
Berlin has since unveiled draft legislation to legalize circumcision. But as a recent study by the Jewish People Policy Institute makes clear, Germany isn’t the only European country where non-Jews are trying to tell Jews “whether and how we can follow our religion.” Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and Iceland all ban kosher slaughter, and Holland came close to joining them this year before a last-minute deal averted the threat. Switzerland is now considering abolishing eternal cemeteries, a cornerstone of Jewish burial practice. Switzerland and France have both denied Jews the right to reschedule public exams administered on Shabbat or Jewish holidays. And the list could go on.
Perhaps even more troubling is the rise in physical assaults on Jews. Anti-Semitic attacks have occurred in many countries: In Germany, for instance, a rabbi out walking with his six-year-old daughter was brutally assaulted in August. But the worst outrages have occurred in France. In March, a Muslim extremist murdered three schoolchildren and a teacher at a Jewish school in Toulouse, while just two weeks ago, a firebomb thrown at a kosher supermarket in a Parisian suburb wounded four people, at least one of them seriously.
A decade ago, at the height of the intifada, it was Israelis who had to fear being killed while engaging in everyday activities like attending school or going grocery shopping. Today, it seems, it’s French Jews who must live with this numbing fear. Being Jewish has always been more comfortable and convenient in Israel than in Europe, but this is the first time in 25 years here that I’ve felt I could honestly say it’s safer as well.
These developments clearly have serious implications – not just for European Jews, but also for European non-Jews and for Israel.
With regard to European Jews, France may prove to be a bellwether: French Jews have been buying second homes in Israel in record numbers in recent years (thereby contributing to the surge in home prices that brought hundreds of thousands of Israelis into the streets last year). Daniel Ben Simon, author of a 2007 book on French Jewry’s response to anti-Semitism, recently estimated that “almost one in two French Jews maintains a residence in Israel.” Partly, this is because many French Jews are committed Zionists: They care about Israel and like spending time here. But it’s also “a sort of insurance policy, just in case the situation in France gets even worse,” Ben Simon noted.
There hasn’t yet been any comparable surge of home-buying in Israel among other European Jews. But if their situation continues to deteriorate, more and more of them may consider leaving – or at least buying themselves an Israeli “insurance policy.”
Yet the implications may be even graver for Europe’s non-Jewish majority. Jews are the canary in the coal mine, in the sense that mistreatment of Jews has always been a warning sign of more widespread societal problems. In Europe, the problem is twofold: The physical attacks on Jews – almost all of which have been perpetrated by Muslims – reflect a rising radicalism among the continent’s sizable Muslim minority, while the legal attacks on Jewish praxis point to a majority increasingly intolerant of “the other.” Unless these trends reverse, Europe may well be headed for an ugly, violent clash between its intolerant majority and its radicalized minority. And unlike the continent’s Jews, who will always be welcome in Israel, its non-Jews have nowhere to go to escape the fallout.
Finally, there are the implications for Israel. As the JPPI study noted, most of the attacks on Jewish praxis have been couched in the language of universal human rights: Circumcision allegedly causes pain and bodily harm to a helpless infant with no medical justification (and never mind the evidence to the contrary); kosher slaughter allegedly causes unacceptable suffering to animals (again, never mind the evidence to the contrary). That proponents of these bans are thereby denying Jews (and Muslims) one of the most fundamental human rights of all – freedom of religion – evidently doesn’t matter.
“Human rights,” of course, are also the favorite justification for European attacks on any and all Israeli self-defense measures: The West Bank security fence impedes Palestinians’ freedom of movement; the Gaza blockade impedes their freedom of commerce; Israeli military operations cause unjustified civilian casualties. Here too, no evidence to the contrary seems to matter (such as the testimony by a former commander of British forces in Afghanistan that the Israel Defense Forces does “more to safeguard the rights of civilians in a combat zone than any other army in the history of warfare.”) Nor does the fact that acceding to European demands to eschew such measures would deprive Israelis of the most fundamental human right of all: the right to life.
But the fact that this twisted definition of “human rights” is now being turned against Europe’s own citizens means the disease is metastasizing. And if it continues to spread, even the limited support Israel now receives from European governments is liable to evaporate.
Yet even so, Israel will likely get the better of the bargain. For if these trends continue, it may well be compensated for the loss of European support by a mass immigration of European Jews. Europe, in contrast, would only be poorer for their loss.
The writer is a journalist and commentator.
You know Israel is doing something right when it manages to put both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas on the PR defensive. And it evidently did exactly that with last week’s conference in New York to raise awareness of Jewish refugees from Arab lands.
Yesterday, Hamas lambasted the conference as a “dangerous, unprecedented move,” clearly outraged by anything that could undermine the false idea Palestinians have successfully implanted in the world’s consciousness for decades: that they are the only refugees, the only victims of the Arab-Israeli conflict; hence the world should grant them endless sympathy while treating Israel as the villain.
But Hamas’s pathetic attempt to rewrite history — it claimed the Jews “secretly migrated from Arab countries” before Israel’s 1948 War of Independence and were responsible for the Palestinians’ displacement during that war, whereas in truth, most arrived only after 1948, driven by persecution in their former homes – is far less interesting than the response of Hanan Ashrawi, a veteran PA legislator, member of the PLO’s executive committee and former minister, who once served as spokeswoman of the Palestinian negotiating team and currently functions as a PA envoy-at-large.
In an article published in several Arab media outlets, Ashrawi said that terming Jews from Arab lands “refugees” is a “deception and delusion,” because they “migrated to Israel, which is supposed to be their homeland.” And “if Israel is their homeland, then they are not ‘refugees;’ they are emigrants who returned either voluntarily or due to a political decision.”
What makes this so interesting isn’t just that this argument only works if Israel is in fact the Jewish homeland – something the PA routinely denies, insisting instead that millennia of Jewish history are a fabrication and that Jews therefore have no rights in the land of Israel. Even more interesting is that the PA rejects this argument with regard to Palestinian refugees.
Though every serious peace plan has proposed resettling Palestinian refugees in the Palestinian state-to-be, the PA has consistently demanded that they relocate to Israel instead, saying that otherwise, they would remain refugees. Indeed, its ambassador to Lebanon has said a Palestinian state would even deny citizenship to refugees already living in its territory: They, too, would remain refugees.
By Ashrawi’s logic, what this means is that the Palestinian state won’t be the Palestinian homeland: If it were, then both refugees already in its territory and any who subsequently immigrated to it would cease to be refugees. Hence there would be no reason to demand that they relocate to Israel instead.
But if a Palestinian state won’t be the Palestinian homeland, what conceivable justification could there be for its existence? After all, the point of creating a Palestinian state is supposedly to give the Palestinians a homeland where they can run their own lives and cease to be dependent refugees; if it won’t accomplish that, why bother?
Ashrawi’s statement shouldn’t be dismissed as a mere slip of the tongue, because it reflects something opinion polls have long revealed: To many Palestinians, a Palestinian state really isn’t a longed-for homeland. It’s just a vehicle for destroying Israel.