Analysis from Israel
Allowing border to become starting point for new territorial claims precludes any chance of peace.

I wonder whether the US administration even noticed the statement made by a senior Lebanese cleric last week: that Hizbullah will liberate seven abandoned Shi’ite villages located in pre-1967 Israel. I certainly hope so – because this comment epitomizes what is wrong with Washington’s policy of pressing Israel to cede Shaba Farms to Lebanon.

Shaba, located where Israel, Syria and Lebanon meet, was excluded from Israel’s 2000 pullout from Lebanon because UN mapping experts ruled that it was Syrian rather than Lebanese. But Israel quit every inch of territory that the UN did deem Lebanese, and the Security Council unanimously certified this withdrawal as complete.

Immediately after the pullout, however, Hizbullah began claiming that Shaba was also Lebanese; hence Israel was still occupying Lebanon, and Hizbullah must continue attacking it. The Lebanese government backed this claim, and Syria, to fuel the flames, refused to either assert or withdraw its own claim.

All this was eminently predictable. But the world’s response was shocking: Rather than upholding the Security Council’s unanimous determination regarding the border, both the media and world leaders began describing Shaba as “disputed territory” and muttering about the need to resolve this new “dispute.”

This process culminated in Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the Second Lebanon War in 2006. The resolution, noting “a need to address urgently the causes of the current crisis,” tasked the UN with delineating Lebanon’s borders, “especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa [Shaba] farms area.” In other words, rather than penalizing Hizbullah for the cross-border raid that sparked the war, the council voted unanimously to appease it by abandoning its own previous certification of Israel’s withdrawal as complete.

UN EXPERTS are therefore currently mapping the border. But the US is not even waiting for their conclusions: It has already decided that Shaba must be given to Lebanon. Last month, the Lebanese daily Al-Hayat quoted Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as telling Lebanese officials that Washington was working to secure Israel’s withdrawal from Shaba. And Israeli officials told the Israeli press they had received the same message from both Rice and President George W. Bush.

Even more astonishing, however, is the reasoning Rice and Bush offer for abandoning the Security Council’s unanimous decision of 2000: They want to support the Lebanese government, they say, and the best way to do so is for Israel to give Shaba to Lebanon, thereby removing Hizbullah’s latest excuse for retaining its arms.

That, of course, was precisely the argument for Israel’s original withdrawal from Lebanon: Once the IDF left, Hizbullah would no longer have any excuse for belligerence. But Hizbullah immediately concocted a new excuse: Shaba. Thus world leaders ought to have realized that demanding yet another Israeli withdrawal fit the classic definition of insanity: doing the same thing and expecting different results.

But since they seem incapable of connecting the dots themselves, the deputy chair of Lebanon’s Supreme Shi’ite Islamic Council, Sheikh Abed al-Amir Kiblan, helpfully did it for them during a conference in southern Lebanon last week. According to the Hizbullah-affiliated daily Al-Akhbar, Kiblan declared that seven villages whose Shi’ite inhabitants fled in 1948, and which were subsequently destroyed, “must return to their owners, our country and our people,” and Hizbullah’s arms would achieve this.

In other words, ceding Shaba would not eliminate Hizbullah’s pretext for keeping its arms; the organization already has its next pretext – this time located in pre-1967 Israel – all lined up and ready to go.

BUT PRESSING Israel to cede Shaba is worse than pointless; it is destructive. By demonstrating that no border, even if unanimously certified by the Security Council, is actually final – that each “certified” border is merely a starting point for new territorial claims – it would preclude any chance of Middle East peace.

Clearly, Israel would have no incentive for additional withdrawals under these circumstances. The point of withdrawing to a recognized international border is to a) eliminate your enemy’s reasons for hostilities and b) ensure the world’s backing should your enemy nevertheless continue hostilities. If instead, the world views continued attacks against Israel as grounds for redrawing the international border in the aggressor’s favor, then from Israel’s standpoint, withdrawing is counterproductive: It simply invites further salami-style territorial losses.

Even worse, however, a Hizbullah victory over Shaba would eliminate other countries’ incentive to restrain their own radical organizations. Why should they, if a mere eight years of hostilities by such an organization are sufficient to get the world to back a new territorial claim? This is especially true because in most of Israel’s neighbors, hatred for Israel remains intense. A Pew Global Research poll from last year, for instance, found that more than 70 percent of Egyptians, Jordanians and Palestinians believe that Palestinians’ “rights and needs” cannot be met unless Israel is eradicated.

THUS IF Hizbullah’s tactic succeeds, it would be a win-win proposition for every government in the Middle East: They could simultaneously satisfy their populations by allowing hostilities with Israel to continue, retain international backing by pleading inability to control the radicals and expand their borders at Israel’s expense in the bargain, by claiming that additional Israeli concessions are needed to persuade the radicals to stop fighting.

Moreover, by effectively overturning the long-standing UN principle that acquiring territory through force is unacceptable, ceding Shaba is liable to foment further conflict worldwide. After all, if Hizbullah’s cross-border aggression is grounds for the world to demand that Israel give Lebanon additional territory, why should other countries hungry for a bit of their neighbors’ territory not adopt the same tactic? Just allow an armed organization to perpetrate cross-border raids, claim inability to control it and then demand some of the neighbor’s land to “eliminate the organization’s pretext for keeping its arms.” What could be simpler?

It is rare that a single decision contains the potential for sowing so much havoc. But unless the US, and the world, understand that appeasing Hizbullah at Israel’s expense will only invite further aggression, Shaba could well prove the spark that ignites a chain reaction of international conflicts round the globe.

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Why Israel Needs a Better Political Class

Note: This piece is a response to an essay by Haviv Rettig Gur, which can be found here

Israel’s current political crisis exemplifies the maxim that hard cases make bad law. This case is desperate. Six months after the coronavirus erupted and nine months after the fiscal year began, Israel still lacks both a functioning contact-tracing system and an approved 2020 budget, mainly because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is more worried about politics than the domestic problems that Israel now confronts. The government’s failure to perform these basic tasks obviously invites the conclusion that civil servants’ far-reaching powers must not only be preserved, but perhaps even increased.

This would be the wrong conclusion. Bureaucrats, especially when they have great power, are vulnerable to the same ills as elected politicians. But unlike politicians, they are completely unaccountable to the public.

That doesn’t mean Haviv Rettig Gur is wrong to deem them indispensable. They provide institutional memory, flesh out elected officials’ policies, and supply information the politicians may not know and options they may not have considered. Yet the current crisis shows in several ways why they neither can nor should substitute for elected politicians.

First, bureaucrats are no less prone to poor judgment than politicians. As evidence, consider Siegal Sadetzki, part of the Netanyahu-led triumvirate that ran Israel’s initial response to the coronavirus. It’s unsurprising that Gur never mentioned Sadetzki even as he lauded the triumvirate’s third member, former Health Ministry Director General Moshe Bar Siman-Tov; she and her fellow Health Ministry staffers are a major reason why Israel still lacks a functional test-and-trace system.

Sadetzki, an epidemiologist, was the ministry’s director of public-health services and the only member of the triumvirate with professional expertise in epidemics (Bar Siman-Tov is an economist). As such, her input was crucial. Yet she adamantly opposed expanding virus testing, even publicly asserting that “Too much testing will increase complacence.” She opposed letting organizations outside the public-health system do lab work for coronavirus tests, even though the system was overwhelmed. She opposed sewage monitoring to track the spread of the virus. And on, and on.

Moreover, even after acknowledging that test-and-trace was necessary, ministry bureaucrats insisted for months that their ministry do the tracing despite its glaringly inadequate manpower. Only in August was the job finally given to the army, which does have the requisite personnel. And the system still isn’t fully operational.

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