Analysis from Israel

The ink on Israel’s ransom deal for Gilad Shalit is barely dry, but already, the first fruits are visible: Hamas’ success in obtaining 1,027 terrorists for one kidnapped soldier convinced Egypt to enter the hostage-taking business as well.

Today, Israel’s cabinet is set to approve freeing 25 Egyptian prisoners in exchange for Israeli-American Ilan Grapel. Though the exact prisoner list hasn’t yet been released, Egyptian press reports say all are suspected or convicted of crimes like murder, drug smuggling and human trafficking; an Israeli group says half were involved in terror.

Grapel was arrested in Cairo on June 12, when Egypt, which was deeply involved in brokering the Shalit deal, already knew how much Israel was willing to pay. That he was seized purely as a hostage is obvious from the sheer ludicrousness of the charges. He was originally accused of espionage, but as his classmates at Emory University noted, it would take an extraordinarily incompetent spy to post Facebook photos of himself in his Israeli army uniform: If he were really spying for Israel, highlighting his connection with its army is the last thing he’d do. At some point, even Cairo realized this, so it added new charges, like firebombing Egyptian police stations during the revolution. But it never produced any evidence for those, either.

The motive is equally obvious. As Egypt’s Foreign Ministry noted, the families of Egyptians jailed in Israel began demanding their release the minute they learned of the Shalit deal; the government undoubtedly predicted this reaction and prepared in advance. After all, its status among the post-revolutionary masses is already shaky; it can’t afford to be seen as less capable of extorting the hated Zionists than Hamas.

Granted, these 25 prisoners don’t compare to the hundreds of high-level terrorists freed for Shalit, but the principle is the same; Cairo’s hostage was simply much less valuable. Not only are Grapel’s American parents incapable of
waging the superb Israeli PR campaign conducted by Shalit’s Israeli parents, but someone who traveled to Egypt to work for a legal aid organization and then enthusiastically joined Egypt’s revolution (see photo) can’t compare with an on-duty soldier kidnapped from Israeli soil: While few Israelis could imagine their son in Grapel’s shoes, almost all, in a country where military service is near-universal, could imagine their son in Shalit’s place.

That Egypt’s post-revolutionary government is behaving like a terrorist organization is disgraceful, but hardly surprising: It already showed its contempt for the norms of civilized international behavior last month, when it stood idly by as Israel’s embassy in Cairo was sacked and a mob threatened to lynch the Israeli personnel inside (it finally intervened only at the last moment in response to a phone call from Barack Obama, presumably explaining that if the Israelis were killed, Egypt could kiss its $2 billion a year in U.S. aid good-bye).

Nevertheless, it’s deeply worrying that even a country technically at peace with Israel now feels no qualms about treating it the way Hamas does. It’s hard to imagine better proof of just how badly the Shalit deal undermined Israeli deterrence.

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Why Israel Needs a Better Political Class

Note: This piece is a response to an essay by Haviv Rettig Gur, which can be found here

Israel’s current political crisis exemplifies the maxim that hard cases make bad law. This case is desperate. Six months after the coronavirus erupted and nine months after the fiscal year began, Israel still lacks both a functioning contact-tracing system and an approved 2020 budget, mainly because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is more worried about politics than the domestic problems that Israel now confronts. The government’s failure to perform these basic tasks obviously invites the conclusion that civil servants’ far-reaching powers must not only be preserved, but perhaps even increased.

This would be the wrong conclusion. Bureaucrats, especially when they have great power, are vulnerable to the same ills as elected politicians. But unlike politicians, they are completely unaccountable to the public.

That doesn’t mean Haviv Rettig Gur is wrong to deem them indispensable. They provide institutional memory, flesh out elected officials’ policies, and supply information the politicians may not know and options they may not have considered. Yet the current crisis shows in several ways why they neither can nor should substitute for elected politicians.

First, bureaucrats are no less prone to poor judgment than politicians. As evidence, consider Siegal Sadetzki, part of the Netanyahu-led triumvirate that ran Israel’s initial response to the coronavirus. It’s unsurprising that Gur never mentioned Sadetzki even as he lauded the triumvirate’s third member, former Health Ministry Director General Moshe Bar Siman-Tov; she and her fellow Health Ministry staffers are a major reason why Israel still lacks a functional test-and-trace system.

Sadetzki, an epidemiologist, was the ministry’s director of public-health services and the only member of the triumvirate with professional expertise in epidemics (Bar Siman-Tov is an economist). As such, her input was crucial. Yet she adamantly opposed expanding virus testing, even publicly asserting that “Too much testing will increase complacence.” She opposed letting organizations outside the public-health system do lab work for coronavirus tests, even though the system was overwhelmed. She opposed sewage monitoring to track the spread of the virus. And on, and on.

Moreover, even after acknowledging that test-and-trace was necessary, ministry bureaucrats insisted for months that their ministry do the tracing despite its glaringly inadequate manpower. Only in August was the job finally given to the army, which does have the requisite personnel. And the system still isn’t fully operational.

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