Analysis from Israel

In 2007, the self-proclaimed Quartet of Middle East peace negotiators (comprising the U.S., UN, EU, and Russia) appointed former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as its envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, financing his salary, office, staff, expenses, etc. Four years later, two conclusions are inevitable. First, the Quartet has been well-served; Blair’s situation assessments are often far more accurate than anything Quartet members seem to get from their own diplomats. Second, the Quartet is wasting its money — because his advice is steadfastly ignored.

This week, for instance, Blair warned that the Arab Spring, far from making Israeli-Palestinian peace talks more urgent, makes them almost impossible. Israel no longer knows what regional threats it may face, he explained, while Palestinian leaders will have trouble making “difficult compromises which will be tough to sell, in circumstances where they don’t know the regional context into which such compromises will be played.”

That should be obvious. After decades of stable peace with Egypt and a quiet border with Syria, Israel today enjoys neither. The past month saw two mass infiltration attempts along the Syrian border, while the signs from Egypt are worrying: The Muslim Brotherhood, as the best-organized political movement, is likely to increase its influence significantly in this fall’s planned election; Egypt has already repeatedly violated one agreement with Israel; even secular, Western-oriented politicians want to “renegotiate” the peace treaty out of existence; and 54 percent of Egyptians want it abrogated altogether.

Under these circumstances, how could Israel withdraw from the West Bank — its only remaining stable front — when its two previous withdrawals, from southern Lebanon and Gaza, both resulted in terrorist organizations (Hezbollah and Hamas, respectively) taking over and using these areas as bases for launching rockets at Israel?

Moreover, how can the Palestinian Authority make concessions when it doesn’t know whether the new Egyptian government will support it or denounce it as a traitor? Just this week, for instance, Amr Moussa, widely considered Egypt’s leading presidential contender, said he favored Israeli-Palestinian peace, but “not at any price” — a sharp departure from Egypt’s previous willingness to accept any agreement the Palestinians make, and a clear warning that he may oppose Palestinian concessions.

Similarly, how can the PA concede the refugees’ “right of return” when Damascus, which has sought to distract attention from its repression of pro-democracy protests by using Palestinian refugees in Syria against Israel, would undoubtedly use them against the PA for the same purpose?

But instead of recognizing these obvious facts, France is pushing a plan to resume negotiations in Paris this fall, while the U.S. is working on its own plan for autumn talks in Washington. That both also propose a formula entirely unacceptable to Israel — requiring it to cede the entire West Bank without any Palestinian concession on the refugees in exchange, in line with Barack Obama’s May 19 speech — is mere icing on the cake.

It would be better if the Quartet actually took Blair’s advice. But since it won’t, it may as well at least stop wasting money on an unheeded envoy.

Subscribe to Evelyn’s Mailing List

Why Israel Needs a Better Political Class

Note: This piece is a response to an essay by Haviv Rettig Gur, which can be found here

Israel’s current political crisis exemplifies the maxim that hard cases make bad law. This case is desperate. Six months after the coronavirus erupted and nine months after the fiscal year began, Israel still lacks both a functioning contact-tracing system and an approved 2020 budget, mainly because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is more worried about politics than the domestic problems that Israel now confronts. The government’s failure to perform these basic tasks obviously invites the conclusion that civil servants’ far-reaching powers must not only be preserved, but perhaps even increased.

This would be the wrong conclusion. Bureaucrats, especially when they have great power, are vulnerable to the same ills as elected politicians. But unlike politicians, they are completely unaccountable to the public.

That doesn’t mean Haviv Rettig Gur is wrong to deem them indispensable. They provide institutional memory, flesh out elected officials’ policies, and supply information the politicians may not know and options they may not have considered. Yet the current crisis shows in several ways why they neither can nor should substitute for elected politicians.

First, bureaucrats are no less prone to poor judgment than politicians. As evidence, consider Siegal Sadetzki, part of the Netanyahu-led triumvirate that ran Israel’s initial response to the coronavirus. It’s unsurprising that Gur never mentioned Sadetzki even as he lauded the triumvirate’s third member, former Health Ministry Director General Moshe Bar Siman-Tov; she and her fellow Health Ministry staffers are a major reason why Israel still lacks a functional test-and-trace system.

Sadetzki, an epidemiologist, was the ministry’s director of public-health services and the only member of the triumvirate with professional expertise in epidemics (Bar Siman-Tov is an economist). As such, her input was crucial. Yet she adamantly opposed expanding virus testing, even publicly asserting that “Too much testing will increase complacence.” She opposed letting organizations outside the public-health system do lab work for coronavirus tests, even though the system was overwhelmed. She opposed sewage monitoring to track the spread of the virus. And on, and on.

Moreover, even after acknowledging that test-and-trace was necessary, ministry bureaucrats insisted for months that their ministry do the tracing despite its glaringly inadequate manpower. Only in August was the job finally given to the army, which does have the requisite personnel. And the system still isn’t fully operational.

Read more
Archives