Analysis from Israel

Hundreds of Palestinian residents of Syria tried to storm Israel’s border for the second time in three weeks yesterday to mark “Naksa Day,” the Arabic term for Israel’s 1967 victory over the Syrian, Jordanian, and Egyptian armies. The Syrian government’s interest in allowing them to reach the border, normally a closed military zone, is obvious. Bashar al-Assad hoped to distract attention from his ongoing massacre of pro-democracy protesters. But what were the Palestinians themselves trying to achieve?

To Western journalists and diplomats, the answer is equally obvious. The goal was to increase pressure on Israel to accede to a Palestinian state in the 1967 lines. But according to Dr. Sabri Saidam, a former Palestinian communications minister and self-described Internet guru, that isn’t what Palestinians themselves are saying.

Young Palestinians, he asserted in an interview with Haaretz last week, are more committed than ever before, but most of them “are not talking about the peace process or the Arab [peace] initiative or the 1967 borders.” So if they have no interest in the peace process or the 1967 borders, what exactly are they committed to?

Their commitment, Saidam enthusiastically declared, is epitomized by the young Syrian-Palestinian–one of hundreds who successfully breached Israel’s borders on May 15–who triumphantly made it all the way to Jaffa. In short, young Palestinians aren’t committed to a state in the 1967 lines; what they are seeking is a “return” to pre-1967 Israel–towns like Jaffa and Haifa and Safed. And as everyone knows, allowing 4.8 million Palestinians to “return” to pre-1967 Israel would spell the demise of the Jewish state.

That, of course, is also the official position of Israel’s Palestinian “peace partner,” as I detailed here. But even if you assume, as Western journalists and diplomats blithely do, that this is a mere bargaining chip which the Palestinian leadership plans to sacrifice for a state in the 1967 lines, how do they imagine any Palestinian leader will be able to do so when his public views “returning” to pre-1967 Israel not as a bargaining chip, but as the primary goal?

In a recent column on Naksa Day in the Syrian government newspaper Al-Baath, columnist Ahmad Hassan summarized the goal bluntly:

This is not the “Middle East conflict”; it is the Israeli-Arab conflict. It is not a border conflict . . . it is a struggle for survival. . . . Neither we nor the entire region has a natural future in the shadow of Israeli existence, and there is no place for Israel in our natural future or that of the region.

Indeed, this point is inherent in the very name “Naksa Day.” The word naksa means “setback.” And what goal was set back when the Arabs failed to defeat Israel in 1967, at a time when it controlled none of what are now termed the “occupied territories”? Clearly, the goal of eradicating pre-1967 Israel.

Not all Arabs still want to turn the clock back to the days before Israel existed. But a great many do. And that’s precisely why Palestinians have said “no” to every offer of statehood since 1947.

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Why Israel Needs a Better Political Class

Note: This piece is a response to an essay by Haviv Rettig Gur, which can be found here

Israel’s current political crisis exemplifies the maxim that hard cases make bad law. This case is desperate. Six months after the coronavirus erupted and nine months after the fiscal year began, Israel still lacks both a functioning contact-tracing system and an approved 2020 budget, mainly because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is more worried about politics than the domestic problems that Israel now confronts. The government’s failure to perform these basic tasks obviously invites the conclusion that civil servants’ far-reaching powers must not only be preserved, but perhaps even increased.

This would be the wrong conclusion. Bureaucrats, especially when they have great power, are vulnerable to the same ills as elected politicians. But unlike politicians, they are completely unaccountable to the public.

That doesn’t mean Haviv Rettig Gur is wrong to deem them indispensable. They provide institutional memory, flesh out elected officials’ policies, and supply information the politicians may not know and options they may not have considered. Yet the current crisis shows in several ways why they neither can nor should substitute for elected politicians.

First, bureaucrats are no less prone to poor judgment than politicians. As evidence, consider Siegal Sadetzki, part of the Netanyahu-led triumvirate that ran Israel’s initial response to the coronavirus. It’s unsurprising that Gur never mentioned Sadetzki even as he lauded the triumvirate’s third member, former Health Ministry Director General Moshe Bar Siman-Tov; she and her fellow Health Ministry staffers are a major reason why Israel still lacks a functional test-and-trace system.

Sadetzki, an epidemiologist, was the ministry’s director of public-health services and the only member of the triumvirate with professional expertise in epidemics (Bar Siman-Tov is an economist). As such, her input was crucial. Yet she adamantly opposed expanding virus testing, even publicly asserting that “Too much testing will increase complacence.” She opposed letting organizations outside the public-health system do lab work for coronavirus tests, even though the system was overwhelmed. She opposed sewage monitoring to track the spread of the virus. And on, and on.

Moreover, even after acknowledging that test-and-trace was necessary, ministry bureaucrats insisted for months that their ministry do the tracing despite its glaringly inadequate manpower. Only in August was the job finally given to the army, which does have the requisite personnel. And the system still isn’t fully operational.

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