Analysis from Israel

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen proudly declared this week that “What has happened in Libya sends a clear signal to autocratic regimes all over the world — you cannot neglect the will of the people.” That might have been true, had he not declared in the very same breath that NATO’s military intervention in Libya would under no circumstances be replicated in Syria. “I can completely rule that out,” he said. In light of that corollary, here is how autocratic regimes – and many ordinary people worldwide – will actually interpret the “clear signal” sent by events in Libya:

First, you’re much better off being friends with Russia and China than the West. Almost two decades ago, Muammar Qaddafi decided to start courting the West: He paid billions of dollars in compensation to victims of various terror attacks allegedly perpetrated by Libya, most notably the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, and dismantled his nuclear program. Syria, in contrast, repeatedly thumbed its nose at the West while courting Russia and China.

The result: Western countries sought and obtained a UN Security Council mandate to intervene militarily in Libya and ultimately toppled Qaddafi’s government. But Russia and China vetoed even far milder resolutions targeting Syria. And since the West refuses to act without a UN mandate, Syria is safe from any Western military threat.

Second, joining the radical Islamic camp led by Iran is a good investment. Libya posed no military threat whatsoever to the West, nor did it have any allies who did. But Syria is backed by Iran, with its proven willingness and ability to make mischief for Western interests in the Gulf and to foment terror overseas, most notably by means of Hezbollah. The West has repeatedly shown its reluctance to confront Tehran, even when, for instance, intelligence estimates deemed Iran responsible for more American casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan than Sunni radicals were. And since intervention in Syria almost certainly would trigger conflict with Syria’s Iranian patron, the West isn’t interested.

Corollary: The West really is a paper tiger, just as Iran, Al-Qaida and other radical Islamists have always claimed. It’s perfectly willing to attack comparatively defenseless Libya, but avoids taking on countries capable of striking back.

Third, the West really does care about nothing but oil. If you discount oil – of which Libya has a lot and Syria very little – it’s hard to explain why the West intervened in Libya but not Syria. You certainly can’t explain it on humanitarian grounds; Bashar Assad’s regime has been killing, torturing and jailing its own citizens with Qaddafi-style abandon ever since Syria’s uprising began in March. And from a strategic perspective, Syria is by far the more important country: Libya has no strategic significance whatsoever for the West, whereas regime change in Syria would deprive Iran of a key ally and sever its land bridge to Hezbollah.

If the West doesn’t understand that this is how much of the world will interpret its behavior, that is deeply disturbing. And if it knows about it, but doesn’t care , that is even more disturbing.

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Why Israel Needs a Better Political Class

Note: This piece is a response to an essay by Haviv Rettig Gur, which can be found here

Israel’s current political crisis exemplifies the maxim that hard cases make bad law. This case is desperate. Six months after the coronavirus erupted and nine months after the fiscal year began, Israel still lacks both a functioning contact-tracing system and an approved 2020 budget, mainly because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is more worried about politics than the domestic problems that Israel now confronts. The government’s failure to perform these basic tasks obviously invites the conclusion that civil servants’ far-reaching powers must not only be preserved, but perhaps even increased.

This would be the wrong conclusion. Bureaucrats, especially when they have great power, are vulnerable to the same ills as elected politicians. But unlike politicians, they are completely unaccountable to the public.

That doesn’t mean Haviv Rettig Gur is wrong to deem them indispensable. They provide institutional memory, flesh out elected officials’ policies, and supply information the politicians may not know and options they may not have considered. Yet the current crisis shows in several ways why they neither can nor should substitute for elected politicians.

First, bureaucrats are no less prone to poor judgment than politicians. As evidence, consider Siegal Sadetzki, part of the Netanyahu-led triumvirate that ran Israel’s initial response to the coronavirus. It’s unsurprising that Gur never mentioned Sadetzki even as he lauded the triumvirate’s third member, former Health Ministry Director General Moshe Bar Siman-Tov; she and her fellow Health Ministry staffers are a major reason why Israel still lacks a functional test-and-trace system.

Sadetzki, an epidemiologist, was the ministry’s director of public-health services and the only member of the triumvirate with professional expertise in epidemics (Bar Siman-Tov is an economist). As such, her input was crucial. Yet she adamantly opposed expanding virus testing, even publicly asserting that “Too much testing will increase complacence.” She opposed letting organizations outside the public-health system do lab work for coronavirus tests, even though the system was overwhelmed. She opposed sewage monitoring to track the spread of the virus. And on, and on.

Moreover, even after acknowledging that test-and-trace was necessary, ministry bureaucrats insisted for months that their ministry do the tracing despite its glaringly inadequate manpower. Only in August was the job finally given to the army, which does have the requisite personnel. And the system still isn’t fully operational.

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