Analysis from Israel

Western leaders, preoccupied with Libya, seem blithely unconcerned with what is happening in neighboring Egypt, content to accept Egyptian officials’ repeated pledges that of course the treaty with Israel will be preserved. But despite all those comforting promises, there are grounds for serious concern that the new regime in Cairo may end up sparking the first Egyptian-Israeli war in four decades.

In today’s Jerusalem Post, veteran Middle East analyst Barry Rubin lays out his reasons for this fear. I have a different reason: the implications of what’s been happening with Egypt’s natural gas pipeline to Israel.

Last week, the pipeline was shut down by the third terror attack in three months. The first took place amid the chaos of revolution, six days before Hosni Mubarak’s February 11 resignation; it closed the pipeline for almost six weeks. The second occurred on March 27, under the new government, and did no damage only because the bombs failed to detonate. The third is expected to shut the pipeline for another four to six weeks.

Egyptian officials disclaimed all responsibility, and contractually, they’re correct. The contract defines terror attacks as force majeure for which Egypt isn’t liable. Yet protecting the pipeline is hardly mission impossible; the proof is that Mubarak’s government did it. In the first three years after the gas began flowing in 2008, not a single terror attack disrupted the supply.

The difference is that Mubarak deemed protecting the pipeline a priority and devoted the necessary resources to doing so. The new government apparently doesn’t care. Hence even after the two previous terror attacks, it saw no need to beef up the pipeline’s lax security.

Clearly, the pipeline isn’t a casus belli. The interrupted gas supply is an expensive nuisance (since Israel must replace it with pricier substitutes), not an existential threat.

But a government so lackadaisical about protecting the pipeline might well prove equally lackadaisical about protecting its 250-kilometer-long border with Israel. And that would be an existential threat.

Terrorists have long sought to attack Israel from Sinai, but until now, with limited success: Mubarak kept the peace. But should terrorist organizations conclude that the new government is indifferent to border security, attacks will proliferate. And enough successful attacks could ultimately force Israel into a military response.

Precisely because most Egyptians loathe the peace with Israel–a recent poll found that 54% want to abrogate the treaty, while only 36% want to preserve it–the new government will be tempted to treat “protecting Israel” as a low priority. That means Israel’s planned fence along the once-peaceful border is suddenly high-priority.

But it also means that if Western leaders want to prevent a war, they should make it clear now that preserving the peace in reality, rather than merely on paper, is a prerequisite for Western support.

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Why Israel Needs a Better Political Class

Note: This piece is a response to an essay by Haviv Rettig Gur, which can be found here

Israel’s current political crisis exemplifies the maxim that hard cases make bad law. This case is desperate. Six months after the coronavirus erupted and nine months after the fiscal year began, Israel still lacks both a functioning contact-tracing system and an approved 2020 budget, mainly because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is more worried about politics than the domestic problems that Israel now confronts. The government’s failure to perform these basic tasks obviously invites the conclusion that civil servants’ far-reaching powers must not only be preserved, but perhaps even increased.

This would be the wrong conclusion. Bureaucrats, especially when they have great power, are vulnerable to the same ills as elected politicians. But unlike politicians, they are completely unaccountable to the public.

That doesn’t mean Haviv Rettig Gur is wrong to deem them indispensable. They provide institutional memory, flesh out elected officials’ policies, and supply information the politicians may not know and options they may not have considered. Yet the current crisis shows in several ways why they neither can nor should substitute for elected politicians.

First, bureaucrats are no less prone to poor judgment than politicians. As evidence, consider Siegal Sadetzki, part of the Netanyahu-led triumvirate that ran Israel’s initial response to the coronavirus. It’s unsurprising that Gur never mentioned Sadetzki even as he lauded the triumvirate’s third member, former Health Ministry Director General Moshe Bar Siman-Tov; she and her fellow Health Ministry staffers are a major reason why Israel still lacks a functional test-and-trace system.

Sadetzki, an epidemiologist, was the ministry’s director of public-health services and the only member of the triumvirate with professional expertise in epidemics (Bar Siman-Tov is an economist). As such, her input was crucial. Yet she adamantly opposed expanding virus testing, even publicly asserting that “Too much testing will increase complacence.” She opposed letting organizations outside the public-health system do lab work for coronavirus tests, even though the system was overwhelmed. She opposed sewage monitoring to track the spread of the virus. And on, and on.

Moreover, even after acknowledging that test-and-trace was necessary, ministry bureaucrats insisted for months that their ministry do the tracing despite its glaringly inadequate manpower. Only in August was the job finally given to the army, which does have the requisite personnel. And the system still isn’t fully operational.

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