Evelyn Gordon
Analysis from Israel

A Palestinian Train Wreck Made in Europe

Published September 15, 2011

As Western diplomats scramble to avert what one termed “a potential train wreck” — the Palestinians’ bid for UN recognition as a state, whose possible consequences, diplomats say, include a collapse of the Palestinian Authority, a Hamas takeover and renewed Israeli-Palestinian violence – two columns published today offer useful reminders: This particular train wreck was made in Europe. And it was made in violation of an agreement that Europe itself had signed.

Writing in Haaretz, Ari Shavit correctly recalls that “the Palestinian September was conceived by two European statesmen – Bernard Kouchner and Javier Solana.”

Solana, then the European Union’s top foreign policy official, announced in July 2009 that the West should set a deadline, and if an Israeli-Palestinian agreement had not been reached by then, the UN Security Council should simply dictate its own solution to all final-status issues and recognize a Palestinian state within those parameters. Fifteen months later, Kouchner, who was then France’s foreign minister, confirmed that Europe didn’t rule out “the Security Council option.”

The PA’s economy depends on donations, and Europe is the PA’s largest donor. Moreover, it is irreplaceable: Arab states routinely default on their pledges. Thus, the PA would never have considered a UN bid without assurance that European aid would continue. But with two such high-level European officials openly voicing support for the UN option, the PA knew it had nothing to fear.

Granted, Washington’s response didn’t help. The Obama administration started publicly opposing the UN option only recently; back in 2009, it didn’t even deny media reports that Solana’s “trial balloon” was launched with its approval. Obama’s statement at the UN last September, that he hoped to welcome a Palestinian state by this September, also encouraged Palestinians to think he would support their bid. Nevertheless, Europe was the instigator.

But worse than the fact Europe created this “train wreck” is the fact that, as Nicole Horrelt notes in today’s Jerusalem Post, it did so in violation of an agreement the EU itself had signed as a witness: the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, a cornerstone of the Oslo process, which states explicitly that “Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.” Needless to say, UN recognition of a Palestinian state in those territories would be a radical change in their status.

Basically, here’s what happened: The EU simply wanted Israel to capitulate. Like the Palestinians, it thinks Israel should withdraw to the 1967 lines and cede East Jerusalem; like the Palestinians, it opposes Israel’s demands for defensible borders and recognition as a Jewish state. But Israel saw the Oslo process as a negotiation that required both sides to compromise, and it has thus far refused to capitulate completely on these issues. So, like any spoiled child, when Europe saw that its Oslo toy wasn’t working the way it wanted, it decided to smash it.

And now, Israelis and Palestinians alike are going to pay the price for Europe’s petulance.

Originally Published in: Commentary
Original Link: http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/09/15/palestinians-european-union-un/
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