Peace Process
One of the worst things about many “human rights” organizations is the way they actually undermine some very fundamental human rights. A prime example is B’Tselem’s new report on Palestinian civilian deaths during this summer’s war in Gaza. Few people would disagree that the presumption of innocence is an important right, but when it comes to Israel, B’Tselem simply jettisons it. In fact, the group states with shocking explicitness that it considers Israel guilty until proven innocent.
Take, for instance, one incident the report discusses, an attack on the a-Dali building in Khan Yunis. B’Tselem doesn’t mention any combatants being present, but an alert Jerusalem Post reporter recalled that Amnesty International had identified one fatality as a combatant. He asked about this discrepancy, and here’s his account of B’Tselem’s response:
Without addressing the specific incident, a B’Tselem representative said there were cases where the group suspected that fighters may have been involved, but it was only reporting their involvement where the evidence was hard and clear.
In other words, if B’Tselem isn’t certain whether the victims were combatants or civilians, it lists them as civilians and then accuses Israel of war crimes. In fact, it does this even if it “suspects that fighters may have been involved.” In short, it presumes Israel’s guilt unless proven otherwise.
Moreover, the report stressed repeatedly that B’Tselem “has no way of knowing” why Israel struck any particular target, and evidently, it doesn’t care. But as NGO Monitor pointed out, the “why” is crucial: If, say, the building was used to store weapons or launch rockets at Israel, then it was a legitimate military target. Without knowing whether the building was targeted legitimately or indiscriminately, it’s impossible to accuse Israel of war crimes–unless, of course, you simply presume Israel’s guilt.
But B’Tselem goes beyond merely presuming Israel’s guilt; it also deliberately omits exculpatory evidence. Take, for instance, the attack on the Kaware home in Khan Yunis. As the report accurately says, the family left after receiving an IDF warning, but other civilians subsequently entered, and the IDF realized this too late to abort its strike. What B’Tselem left out, however, was that those civilians came deliberately to serve as human shields for the building, which the IDF claimed was a Hamas command center. The surviving Kawares said this explicitly, and several prominent media outlets reported it at the time. “Our neighbors came in to form a human shield,” Salah Kaware told the New York Times. Yet this all-important fact–that civilians had deliberately returned to serve as human shields, a development the IDF couldn’t have predicted–was simply omitted from the report.
The same goes for the bombing of Beit Lahiya. As the report correctly notes, the IDF warned residents to evacuate, and many did. But others stayed, and some were killed. B’Tselem blames the IDF for this, saying, “Many had nowhere to go, as the military was conducting strikes throughout the Gaza Strip.”
But Palestinian human-rights activist Bassem Eid offered a very different explanation in a lecture at last month’s Limmud conference in England. According to his sources in Gaza, armed Hamas gunmen arrived and warned that anyone who left town would be considered a collaborator. And Hamas, as is well known, executes collaborators. So faced with a choice of certain death at Hamas’s hands or possible death at the IDF’s hands, residents who encountered those gunmen returned home.
Perhaps B’Tselem truly didn’t know this–in which case either its research is shoddy or its sources in Gaza are unreliable. Or perhaps, as in the Kaware case, it deliberately omitted this information. But either way, the result is the same: B’Tselem blamed Israel for a crime actually committed by Hamas. Had Hamas not prevented the evacuation, those civilians wouldn’t have died.
The report did acknowledge that Hamas stored arms in civilian buildings, launched rockets from civilian areas, and otherwise violated international law; it even admitted that this made it “extremely challenging … to avoid harming civilians.” So how was Israel supposed to have surmounted this challenge? That’s not B’Tselem’s problem; it “does not purport to offer the Israeli government or the military any operative plans for conducting armed conflict in Gaza.”
In other words, it admits that preventing civilian casualties under these circumstances is nearly impossible, but declares that unless Israel can accomplish the impossible, it effectively has no right to defend its citizens against a terrorist organization. And self-defense may be an even more fundamental human right than the presumption of innocence.
But in B’Tselem’s view, evidently, Israelis have no rights. They are only and always guilty.
Originally published in Commentary on January 28, 2015
That’s the unspoken message of Amos Yadlin’s appointment as Labor’s candidate for defense minister
The most critical issue to be decided by the upcoming election came clear last week, yet it seems to have gone virtually unremarked. It isn’t tensions in the north, terror in Tel Aviv, Iran’s nuclear program, relations with America or any socioeconomic issue. Rather, it’s whether Israel will unilaterally withdraw from the West Bank.
There have been hints of this for a while. But the clincher was last week’s announcement by the Labor-Hatnuah joint ticket – the self-proclaimed “Zionist Camp” – that its candidate for defense minister, should it form the next government, is Amos Yadlin.
Yadlin is probably Israel’s leading advocate of unilateral withdrawal. He has used his current post as head of the Institute for National Security Studies to push the idea relentlessly, in forums ranging from briefings for Israeli reporters to articles in prestigious American journals. And it’s highly unlikely that someone of Yadlin’s stature – a former director of Military Intelligence who now heads one of Israel’s most prestigious think tanks – would agree to be any party’s candidate without assurance that his flagship policy would be on the table. Someone like Yadlin doesn’t enter government just to decide whether the IDF should add or cut another tank brigade.
Granted, both Labor leader Isaac Herzog and Hatnuah leader Tzipi Livni would prefer a final-status agreement with the Palestinians, so any government they form would first try to reach one. But every round of final-status talks for the last 20 years has ended in failure, and the Herzog-Livni effort is unlikely to fare better. And once the talks collapse, it would be time for Yadlin’s Plan B – unilateral withdrawal from 85% of the West Bank.
Indeed, Livni hinted as much in a Jerusalem Post interview last week. Asked why she thought yet another round of talks with Mahmoud Abbas would do any good, she replied, “The real question for me as an Israeli leader is not who is to blame, but how can we move forward in accordance to the vision of two states for two peoples, that represents the Israeli interest. Assuming that Abbas chose a strategy of going to the UN and International Criminal Court against Israel, as an Israeli leader we need to find a way to move forward – whether with him or in another direction.”
In other words, if an agreement with Abbas is unattainable, Israel needs to find “another direction” through which to advance toward two states. That’s Yadlin’s position as well – and in his view, that “other direction” is unilaterally quitting most of the West Bank.
Still, polls currently show Labor-Hatnuah winning only about 24 Knesset seats (out of 120), so it would need support from several other parties. And since polls also show that most Israelis oppose leaving the West Bank unilaterally, such a Knesset majority would surely be hard to find, right?
Wrong. It would be depressingly easy.
First, there’s Moshe Kahlon’s Koolanu party, whose diplomatic platform is being drafted by another leading advocate of unilateral withdrawal: the party’s number four, Michael Oren. Like Yadlin, Oren has pushed this idea in repeated articles and interviews in both Israeli and American media outlets. And someone of his stature – a former ambassador to Washington and acclaimed historian – is similarly unlikely to have joined any party, much less a brand-new, untested one, without assurance that his flagship policy would be on the table. So that’s another eight or nine votes in favor.
Meretz and the Arab parties will vote for any withdrawal, even if they’re outside the coalition; as evidence, see the 2005 disengagement from Gaza. That’s another 17 or 18 votes.
And United Torah Judaism can always be bought, just as Ariel Sharon did when his government was in danger of falling over the Gaza pullout. Then, UTJ’s price for rescuing the government was NIS 30 million. It would presumably demand more for the West Bank, but there’s no reason to think Labor-Hatnuah won’t pay. So there’s another seven votes.
Shas voters lean right, but party chairman and strongman Aryeh Deri leans left. It was Deri who, by all accounts, persuaded Shas’s founder and spiritual leader, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, not to oppose the 1993 Oslo Accord. Later, after Eli Yishai replaced Deri as party leader, Shas opposed the Gaza disengagement. But since then, Yosef has died, Yishai has been forced out and Deri’s control over Shas is absolute. Another six to nine votes.
Finally, there’s Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid. Before entering politics, Lapid avidly supported the Gaza pullout as a journalist. And in recent months, he has declared repeatedly that Israel must “separate” from the Palestinians and draw its own borders. In short, if another round of Israeli-Palestinian talks fails, he’ll back unilateral withdrawal. Another 10 or 11 votes.
Add it all up, and that’s 72 to 78 votes in favor of withdrawal – far more than the 61 needed. Thus if Labor-Hatnuah forms the next government, unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank is highly likely.
That’s grim news for the many centrists who are fed up with the current government but have no wish to repeat the disastrous experiment of the Gaza pullout in the West Bank, because it means such a pullout can be averted only if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains in power. And that means voting for one of the only three parties certain to back him to form the next government: Likud, Bayit Yehudi or Yishai’s new party. Even Yisrael Beiteinu – which probably wouldn’t support a unilateral pullout – has indicated that it would prefer Herzog over Netanyahu as the next premier, and most of the other small parties have hinted the same.
True, Labor-Hatnuah isn’t publicly touting unilateral withdrawal, and neither is any other party. But that’s because doing so would likely result in being trounced at the polls. So instead, withdrawal advocates are keeping quiet and hoping nobody notices that this is what’s at stake in the upcoming election.
But it is. And therefore, anyone who doesn’t want the West Bank turned into a missile-launching pad like Gaza must vote for a fourth Netanyahu government – even if they have to hold their noses and swallow hard to do it.
Originally published in The Jerusalem Post on January 26, 2015
Hamas is currently recruiting thousands of Palestinians aged 15 to 21 into its new “Liberation Army” in Gaza, journalist Khaled Abu Toameh reported today. So on top of the fact that it’s spending its money on a military buildup even as thousands of residents of Hamas-controlled Gaza remain homeless with no help in sight, half the age cohort Hamas seeks to recruit consists of people under 18, whom the United Nations and international human-rights groups define as children. Recruiting child soldiers is generally considered a gross violation of human rights. Yet far from condemning this behavior, the “international community” is actively encouraging it.
After all, you don’t hear much about Hamas’s recruitment efforts from the UN, the EU, the media or major human-rights organizations. But if those child soldiers are someday killed fighting Israel, all of these bodies will vie over who can condemn Israel for “killing children” most vociferously. And it’s precisely that reaction that makes recruiting child soldiers a win-win for Hamas: By so doing, not only can it significantly expand its fighting forces, but it can also ensure that Israel suffers international vilification whenever a war breaks out–all without suffering any negative consequences to itself.
In fact, it’s a triple win for Hamas, because this tactic doesn’t only endanger the child soldiers themselves; it also endangers innocent 15-, 16-, and 17-year-olds. After all, if Hamas is recruiting children this age into its “army,” then Israeli soldiers have to treat every male in that age range as a potential combatant. And in the fog of battle–where it’s often hard for soldiers to tell exactly who is shooting at them, especially since Hamas operatives don’t wear uniforms and frequently open fire from amid civilians–anyone who looks like a potential combatant is more likely to be killed. Thus Israel will be accused of killing even more children.
During last summer’s war in Gaza, for instance, the “official” UN statistics reported worldwide asserted that almost a quarter of the Palestinian fatalities–24 percent–were children. Most people, hearing a figure like that, are shocked and appalled, and immediately conclude that Israel was at best guilty of using excessive force and at worst of war crimes. Consequently, Hamas benefits when this figure is inflated; Alan Dershowitz aptly termed this Hamas’s “dead-baby strategy.”
But it only works because the UN, the media, human-rights groups, world leaders, and all the other sources people depend on for information collaborate with it.
One way they do so is by neglecting to mention that some of those children–we’ll probably never know how many–were actually killed by misfired Hamas rockets or secondary explosions of the weaponry Hamas routinely stores in civilian houses; all Palestinian casualties are automatically blamed on Israel. Another is by neglecting to provide comparative data that would illustrate the difficulty of preventing civilian casualties while fighting terrorists in a dense urban environment, like the fact that the proportion of children killed in U.S. airstrikes in Iraq was much higher, at 39 percent.
A third reason, however, is that the UN carefully doesn’t mention how many of those “children” were males aged 15, 16, or 17; it defines everyone under age 18 as a child and lumps them all together in one grand total. Given Hamas’s known habit of recruiting teenagers, at least some of those killed “children” were certainly either actual combatants or people Israeli soldiers had valid reason to suspect of being combatants. But you’d never know that from the UN, the media, human-rights groups, or world leaders.
You might call this the “dead teenager” variant of Hamas’s strategy: Fan international hatred of Israel by recruiting child soldiers whose deaths will be reported worldwide as “Israel kills innocent children.” And as long as the international community keeps collaborating with this strategy, Hamas will have every incentive to keep right on recruiting child soldiers.
Originally published in Commentary on January 21, 2015
Between Friday’s announcement that the International Criminal Court has opened a “preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine” and Sunday’s airstrike that killed six Hezbollah operatives and an Iranian general, a seemingly minor Israel-related item at the United Nations Security Council last Thursday has been largely ignored. But it shouldn’t be, because it goes to the heart of what’s wrong with the world’s handling of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: According to both the UN and the European Union, signed Israeli-Palestinian agreements are binding on one party only – Israel.
At Thursday’s Security Council briefing, Assistant Secretary-General Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen slammed Israel for freezing tax transfers to the Palestinian Authority, declaring that this was “contrary to Israel’s obligations under the Paris Protocol of the Oslo Accords.” The EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, Federica Mogherini, made an identical claim 10 days earlier.
Though the claim is probably false, let’s assume for a moment that it’s true. The fact remains that Israel’s alleged violation of its “obligations under … the Oslo Accords” was in response to far greater violations of the Palestinians’ obligations under those same accords. Yet far from meriting any equivalent condemnation by the UN or the EU, the Palestinian violations were actively supported by both parties.
According to Article 31(7) of the 1995 Oslo II agreement (formally titled the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), “Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.” This isn’t some trivial technicality; it constitutes the very heart of the Oslo Accords: that Israel and the Palestinians will resolve their differences through negotiations, not unilaterally.
Nevertheless, the Palestinians have grossly and repeatedly violated this clause, including by obtaining UN recognition as a nonmember observer state in 2012, applying to the Security Council for full UN membership last month and joining the ICC as a state party earlier this month. All these moves are aiming at unilaterally changing the status of the West Bank and Gaza from territories whose future will be determined through negotiations to territories belonging to a Palestinian state. Yet no UN or EU official has ever criticized these moves for violating Palestinian obligations under the Oslo Accords, and in fact, both the UN and the EU actively supported them.
It was the UN General Assembly that accepted “Palestine” as a nonmember observer state, with half the EU’s 28 members voting in favor and only one voting against. In last month’s Security Council bid, two of the council’s four EU members voted in favor and none voted against. And when “Palestine” applied to the ICC this month, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon immediately announced that it qualified for membership and would join on April 1, although technically, the court itself should make this decision, as it did when the Palestinians first tried to join in 2009.
In other words, both the UN and the EU think it’s fine for the Palestinians to ride roughshod over their core obligations under the Oslo Accords, but it’s unacceptable for Israel to violate even the most minor element of those accords. And Israel’s violation, if it existed at all, was indeed minor, since the Paris Protocol stipulates the existence of “procedures for the set-off of financial obligations between the two sides, including legal entities under their control or management.” In short, Israel has the legal right to withhold some of the billions of shekels the PA owes to state-owned Israeli entities like the Israel Electric Corporation, and it has always formally justified freezes of tax transfers under this clause. At most, it was guilty of violating the proper procedures for doing so.
All of the above leads to one obvious question: If the UN and EU are going to deem Israeli-Palestinian agreements binding on Israel in every particular but not binding on the Palestinians at all, why on earth would Israel ever sign another?
Originally published in Commentary on January 19, 2015
Courts seeking to expand their jurisdiction always start with ‘easy’ targets, then use that precedent against others
“If Israel falls victim” to the International Criminal Court, “any democracy around the world may find itself in the same danger,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned this weekend after the court announced a “preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine.” Netanyahu is entirely correct. Not only has Israel has done nothing in Gaza that America, Britain, France and others haven’t done in places like Afghanistan and Iraq (as I explained when issuing the same warning in 2012), but there’s strong evidence that Israel took greater care to prevent civilian casualties than any of these countries do. Consequently, they have a major interest in ensuring that this “preliminary examination” goes no further.
Given how frequently international institutions apply double standards to Israel, cynics might retort that other countries have no reason to worry. But activist courts desirous of expanding their jurisdiction always begin with “easy” cases that they know will arouse minimal opposition. Then, once the precedent set in the “easy” case has been accepted, they can apply it to more controversial cases.
That’s precisely how Israel’s Supreme Court gained the power to overturn Knesset legislation, which no law actually authorizes it to do. First, it asserted this power in principle while in practice upholding the law at issue, knowing that a purely theoretical claim would generate much less opposition than actually overturning a law. Next, it used this precedent to overturn one small section of a law regulating investment managers, which nobody outside the field cared about; that bolstered the precedent while still not generating much opposition. Only once the precedent was firmly established did it start making truly controversial rulings, like overturning the law enabling the detention of illegal migrants.
Thus for the ICC, a case against Israel represents a golden opportunity. The court has always aspired to worldwide jurisdiction, but until now, all its cases have involved African countries with weak legal systems. Extending its reach to countries with well-developed legal systems requires an “easy” case that will generate little opposition, and Israel fits the bill: Much of the world would be happy to see it in the dock. Then, once the precedent is established, it can be used to indict other Western countries.
The court’s eagerness to seize this opportunity was evident from the unseemly haste with which prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced her preliminary examination – almost four months before the Palestinians’ ICC membership even takes effect. That bolsters the likelihood that she intends to proceed to a full investigation and then actual charges.
America, France and Britain – the three Western countries most engaged in overseas military operations – thus had a clear interest in keeping the Palestinian Authority from joining the court and starting this process. Instead, France, Britain and the EU as a whole tacitly encouraged it by making it clear that no economic or diplomatic consequences would ensue: The EU will continue funding the PA and supporting it diplomatically. And though Congress may not allow it, the Obama Administration would clearly like to follow suit: It has threatened the PA with no consequences beyond an unspecified “review” of the “implications,” while defending US aid to the PA as benefiting Israel and lambasting Israel for freezing tax transfers to the PA.
Consequently, all three countries will now find themselves in the dock alongside Israel as an essential element of Israel’s defense. After all, the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,” and it’s hard to argue that Israel qualifies if Israel is actually more scrupulous about protecting civilians than other Western countries. And military professionals – as opposed to politicians, journalists, human rights groups and others with no military expertise – generally agree that it is.
That’s why the US army, for instance, sent a “lessons learned” team to Israel after this summer’s Gaza war, inter alia to study Israeli techniques for minimizing civilian casualties. As Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in November, “Israel went to extraordinary lengths to limit collateral damage and civilian casualties … In this kind of conflict, where you are held to a standard that your enemy is not held to, you’re going to be criticized … But they did some extraordinary things to try and limit civilian casualties.”
Similarly, Col. Richard Kemp, the former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, told the Knesset in September that “No army in the world acts with as much discretion and great care as the IDF in order to minimize damage. The US and the UK are careful, but not as much as Israel.” In fact, he said, the global average when fighting in densely populated urban areas is roughly four civilian fatalities for every combatant killed. In Gaza, the ratio of civilian-to-combatant deaths was almost 1:1 – four times better than the global average.
A study published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2009 also supports this conclusion. The study analyzed victims of U.S. airstrikes in Iraq from 2003-2008 and concluded that of those whose age and gender could be determined, 46% were women and 39% were children. In short, at least 85% were civilians, which roughly matches Kemp’s 4:1 ratio.
By contrast, according to UN data on Palestinian fatalities during the Gaza war, 13% were women and 24% were children. So even if the UN data is credible – which, as I explain here, it almost certainly isn’t – only 37% of Palestinian fatalities were women and children, compared to 85% in Iraq. And that’s despite the fact that the NEJM study deliberately excluded the heaviest battles, when troops are most at risk and fire is likely to be most indiscriminate, whereas the Gaza figures include all the most intense fighting. Had NEJM included the heaviest fighting in Iraq, the comparison would have been even more lopsided in Israel’s favor.
In short, if the ICC prosecutes Israel, other Western democracies won’t be far behind – which means they should be taking the lead in trying to get the case against Israel quashed. Threatening the court’s funding, as Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman suggested on Sunday, might be one way to start.
Originally published in The Jerusalem Post on January 19, 2015
I was shocked and disturbed by one of the passages Seth Mandel quoted Wednesday from a book by a well-regarded scholar of comparative religion. According to Karen Armstrong, ascribing Islamist terror mainly to religious motivations is wrong; “Terrorism experts agree that the denial of a people’s right to national self-determination and the occupation of its homeland by foreign forces has historically been the most powerful recruiting agent of terrorist organizations.” As Seth correctly noted, that claim ignores some pretty glaring historical evidence. But it also ignores the latest hard data, published just this month by the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.
According to INSS, only 3 percent of all suicide bombings in 2014 were carried out against foreign armies. The vast majority targeted home-grown governments, militaries, and security services or rival ethnic and religious groups. And needless to say, almost all were carried out by Muslim extremists.
Nor can Armstrong and her unnamed experts be excused on the grounds that the world has changed since her book was published. A decade ago, before the explosive rise of Sunni-versus-Shi’ite violence in places like Iraq and Syria, the collapse of several Arab states and resulting internecine violence in places like Syria, Libya, and Yemen, and the upsurge of violence by groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria or the Pakistani Taliban in Pakistan, perhaps their thesis might have been more tenable. But Fields of Blood: Religion and the History of Violence was published in 2014–the same year in which “foreign occupation” accounted for a mere 3 percent of all suicide bombings.
One can understand why experts might prefer to view Islamist terror as a response to “foreign occupation,” because if that were true, the whole problem would be within the West’s power to solve: Withdraw all Western forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali, and other countries; force Israel to withdraw from the West Bank, India from Kashmir, China from Xinjiang, and so forth; and presto, no more Islamist terror.
Nevertheless, this view has two big problems even aside from the fact that it belies the data. First, it denies Muslim extremists any agency, refusing to acknowledge that they could possibly have dreams and aspirations of their own. All the goals the extremists claim to desire–restoring the caliphate, imposing Sharia law, defeating the West, eradicating Israel, reconquering Andalusia–are dismissed as mere window-dressing.
Indeed, this view reduces Muslims to mere human versions of Pavlov’s dog, responding automatically to the stimulus of “foreign occupation” with no possibility of doing otherwise. And it ought to go without saying that any theory that reduces some human beings to puppets dancing on a string pulled by others–i.e., that ascribes agency to Westerners alone while denying it to Muslims–is liable to be a poor explanation of reality.
Second, because it is a poor explanation of reality, this theory not only precludes any possibility of dealing with the real problem posed by Islamic extremism, but is liable to lead to counterproductive solutions. For instance, if “foreign occupation” were really the problem, then withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan might be productive. But if the problem is that Muslim extremists want to restore the global caliphate, Western withdrawals are actually counterproductive. Withdrawing leaves behind weak governments that the extremists can easily topple, giving them control of more territory and resources; it also makes the extremists look like they’re winning, which attracts more supporters to their banner.
The best way to defeat an extremist ideology is to show its potential adherents that it’s a dead end incapable of producing any real-world gains. But to do that, the West must first recognize that the problem is the ideology, not the straw man of “foreign occupation.”
Originally published in Commentary on January 16,2015
Yesterday, Jonathan Marks dissected the lie of the BDS movement’s alleged commitment to nonviolence–a lie underscored by the South African chapter’s launch of a “fundraising tour” starring Palestinian airline hijacker Leila Khaled. But another lie about the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement was also exploded this week: the lie that it is having an increasing impact on Israel. The truth, according to a new study released yesterday by the Knesset Research and Information Center, is exactly the opposite: Not only has BDS not dented Israel’s economy overall, but Israeli exports have surged even in places where the movement is most active, like Europe.
Overall, the study reports, Israeli exports rose by 80 percent from 2000 to 2013, with exports to Europe rising even more sharply, by 99 percent. But the bulk of this increase has taken place since 2005–i.e., in the years when BDS was most active. From 2005-2013, despite a sharp drop during the global financial crisis of 2009, annual exports to Europe averaged $15.6 billion. That’s almost double the preceding decade’s annual average of $7.8 billion.
Foreign direct investment in Israel has also risen steeply, posting an increase of 58 percent over the last four years alone–precisely the years when BDS was supposedly having its biggest impact.
Most surprisingly, exports from the West Bank and the Golan Heights, which are the primary focus of boycott efforts, rose even faster than exports overall. Consequently, they constituted 3.1 percent of total exports in 2013, up from 0.5 percent in 2000–and the overwhelming majority of that increase also stemmed from exports to Europe. A handful of industries, like Jordan Valley date farmers, have taken a hit, but the impact on Israel as a whole has been negligible.
As the report acknowledged, this is largely because “A major portion of Israeli exports are intermediate products, like electronic components, that sit inside the final products of well-known global companies.” That makes them hard to boycott: How do you boycott the insides of your computer or cellphone?
But it’s also worth noting that even in Europe, where BDS has gained most traction, the movement’s strongholds are found among academics, trade unionists, and unelected EU bureaucrats–i.e., people with no responsibility for the performance of national economies. In contrast, BDS has few champions among elected politicians in national governments, because these politicians are responsible for delivering economic growth to their constituents and view Israel’s innovative tech sector as a potential contributor to this effort.
Consequently, while BDS was making noise in the press, European governments were quietly working to deepen economic ties with Israel. A particularly notable example is the British Embassy Tech Hub, brainchild of British Ambassador to Israel Matthew Gould. Founded in 2011, the Hub essentially functions as a matchmaking service between British and Israeli firms, giving the former access to Israeli high-tech and the latter access to partners who can help them grow their businesses and enter new markets. It’s been so successful that other ambassadors in Israel are now consulting Gould on how to replicate his model at their own embassies.
The bottom line is that for all the hype about BDS, its efforts to strangle Israel have been a total failure. BDS may be thriving in the media and on college campuses, but out in the real world, what’s thriving is Israel’s economy.
Originally published in Commentary
It feels almost tasteless to be writing about good news while France is mourning a horrific terror attack. Yet there’s been so much good news from Israel over the last week that my biggest dilemma has been which item to pick. Having discussed immigration yesterday, it’s time to move onto Israel’s Arab minority–specifically, the stunning new Israel Democracy Institute survey in which 65 percent of Arab citizens said they were either “quite” or “very” proud to be Israeli in 2014, up from 50 percent the previous year.
To be fair, the poll was conducted between April 28 and May 29–meaning after the latest round of Israeli-Palestinian talks broke down, but before the summer’s war in Gaza, the shocking murder of an East Jerusalem teen by Jews, and other difficult events of the past several months. Thus had it been taken today, the number might well be lower.
Nevertheless, given the torrent of accusations of “racism” and “apartheid” that have been hurled at Israel for years now from both inside and outside the country, it’s quite remarkable to discover that as of eight months ago, 65 percent of Israeli Arabs were “proud” to be citizens of that “racist,” “apartheid” Jewish state, and 64 percent said they usually felt their “dignity as a human being is respected” in Israel. This raises the obvious question of whether perhaps Israeli Arabs know something about Israel that its detractors don’t.
In this regard, it’s worth considering some of the survey’s other surprising findings. For instance, 57 percent of Israeli Arabs said they have faith in the Israel Police–second only to the Supreme Court (60 percent), and significantly higher than the proportion of Jews who said the same (45 percent). This reflects the fruit of a decade-long effort by the police to rebuild trust with Arab communities after the nadir reached in October 2000, when policemen killed 13 Arabs in course of suppressing massive, violent Arab riots. Since then, police have tried hard to recruit more Arabs to the force, open more stations in Arab towns, and maintain a regular dialogue with Arab community leaders. And as the survey shows, this effort is working.
Even more astounding is that 51 percent of Arabs expressed confidence in the Israel Defense Forces–aka the “occupation army” that, according to Israel’s detractors, ruthlessly oppresses their Palestinian brethren in the West Bank. This exceeds the level of confidence Israeli Arabs expressed in the Knesset, the media, or their religious leadership and suggests they don’t buy the canard of IDF brutality enthusiastically swallowed overseas. I also suspect the IDF–and Israel as a whole–benefited from comparisons with the real atrocities being perpetrated in Syria and the heavy-handed tactics used by Egypt’s military: The contrast with the meltdown in much of the Arab world can’t help but make Israel look more attractive.
Yet Israeli Arabs’ pride in Israel also reflects the concerted efforts to improve integration and narrow Jewish-Arab gaps that successive governments have made over the past two decades.
For instance, an affirmative action program launched in 2007 quadrupled the proportion of Arabs in the civil service over the space of just four years. It’s still significantly lower than their proportion in the workforce, but nevertheless constitutes dramatic improvement.
Similarly, a government program to subsidize employment of Arab high-tech workers helped quadruple the number of such workers between 2010 and 2013. And in Israel’s premier technological university, the Technion, Arabs now constitute 21 percent of the student body–slightly higher than their share of the population–thanks to a special program to recruit Arab students and give them extra support while they are there.
The gap between Jewish and Arab matriculation rates hasn’t disappeared, but it did shrink by more than a third from 1996-2012. Arabs remain underrepresented among master’s and Ph.D. students, but the percentage of master’s degrees awarded to Arabs more than doubled from 2005-2013 and the percentage of Ph.D.s rose by 40 percent. Concerted efforts to build more Arab schools have brought average class sizes down to the same level as in secular Jewish schools. And so on and so forth.
In short, while gaps and discrimination still exist, Israel has been working hard to reduce them, with considerable success. And Israeli Arabs have responded with growing pride in being citizens of the democratic Jewish state.
Originally published in Commentary
Israel spends much less than the PA on its foreign service, then wonders why it’s losing the PR war
The worst thing about elections is that for the next three months, the media will ignore all the really important issues in favor of trivialities such as daily updates on the prospects for a united center-left bloc. That’s why the bombshell released by the Foreign Ministry last week has evaporated without a trace rather than provoking the outraged debate it should have sparked.
At a conference launching a new Knesset caucus on foreign affairs, the ministry revealed the full dimensions of Israel’s underinvestment in diplomacy. According to the subsequent report in Israel Hayom, Israel spends less than half as much on its foreign service as does the Palestinian Authority – an entity whose per capita gross domestic product is less than a twentieth of Israel’s. And then we wonder why Israel is losing the diplomatic battle.
Moreover, as a percentage of its national budget, Israel significantly underspends most European countries, even though the latter – unlike Israel – aren’t engaged in a worldwide diplomatic battle crucial to their future. Israel devotes only 0.4% of its budget to the foreign service, compared to 1.7% for Britain, 2% for Sweden and Norway, 3.8% for Belgium and 4% for The Netherlands.
Clearly, no problem can be solved just by throwing money at it; without a workable diplomatic strategy, Israel will lose the diplomatic war no matter how much money it invests. But the reverse is no less true: Even a brilliant diplomatic strategy will fail if it’s starved of the requisite resources.
For instance, Israel has diplomatic relations with 159 countries, but it has embassies in less than half of them – only 76. So what happens when the Palestinians bring a hostile resolution to the UN Security Council – as they’re planning to do right now – and Israel has to round up enough votes against it to avoid the need for a US veto? Obviously, Israel needs to lobby every Security Council member with which it has relations. But how effectively can it lobby one of those 83 countries in which it doesn’t even maintain an embassy?
Not having an embassy means not having Israeli diplomats on the ground to make Israel’s case on an ongoing basis and build ties with a country’s leadership. As a result, there’s no groundwork on which to build a last-minute blitz against a Palestinian resolution. And the problem is only compounded if the PA does maintain a diplomatic mission in the country in question – which isn’t inconceivable; the tiny PA maintains some 100 embassies and consulates worldwide.
Granted, Israel’s foreign service sometimes seems to do more harm than good. In a shocking Jerusalem Post column earlier this year, for instance, former Foreign Ministry employee Dan Illouz reported hearing some of Israel’s own diplomats quietly advocate anti-Israel boycotts as a way of pressuring the government into diplomatic concessions, because they see their goal not as defending the elected government’s chosen policies, but as forcing the government to instead adopt their own preferred policies.
Yet Israel also has some truly outstanding diplomats, like UN Ambassador Ron Prosor or Deputy Ambassador to Norway George Deek, a Christian Arab who garnered worldwide attention in September with his moving speech about his own family’s experiences in Israel. Thus instead of dismissing the entire foreign service as a bad investment, Israel would do better to figure out how to recruit more such people, and also how to get rid of the deadweight.
Ultimately, this requires devising a coherent diplomatic strategy. If the country doesn’t have a strategy to begin with, it’s impossible to screen job applicants to ensure they’re suited to carrying out this strategy. It’s also harder to make the case for diverting scarce resources from other needs to the foreign service, because without a coherent strategy, the return on this investment will necessarily be much lower.
But the lack of a diplomatic strategy is itself a symptom of an even bigger problem: Successive Israeli governments still don’t seem to have grasped the fact that Israel is engaged in a diplomatic war no less critical to its future than the military one.
As Yair Frommer, chairman of the Foreign Ministry’s union, noted at last week’s conference, Israel could open 20 new embassies for the price of just one F-35 fighter jet. Or as Gideon Meir, who retired earlier this year as the ministry’s director-general for public diplomacy, put it in a parting interview with the Jerusalem Post, Israel spends billions of dollars on buying the most advanced fighter planes from the US, but refuses to spend even a few million on public diplomacy programs aimed at ensuring that future U.S. Congresses will agree to sell it replacements when the current planes die.
If Israel did understand that it was fighting a war, investing in those extra 20 embassies would be as self-evident as investing in those fighter jets. So would investing in Meir’s sensible plan to finance visits to Israel every year for some 3,000 non-Jews influential on American college campuses – a plan that’s still languishing on some Foreign Ministry desk despite its minuscule annual price tag of $12 million. Indeed, that’s precisely why the PA does spend such an enormous part of its budget on foreign relations: Unlike Israel, it understands very well that it’s fighting a diplomatic war.
The question of what Israel’s diplomatic strategy should be is admittedly one on which reasonable people could disagree (I’ll outline my own ideas in a future column). But no reasonable person would disagree that the road to formulating such a strategy starts with recognizing two facts: Israel is engaged in a real war, and it’s currently abandoning the field to the enemy. The shocking data on Israel’s underinvestment in diplomacy that were unveiled at last week’s conference should have been a springboard for bringing this issue to public attention.
Instead, the news was swiftly buried in a spate of meaningless stories about the latest political maneuvering. And when the next diplomatic defeat inevitably arrives, Israelis will be left wondering, once again, how they lost a battle they didn’t even know they weren’t fighting.
Originally published in The Jerusalem Post
PM keeps asking other governments to do more to combat anti-Israel incitement, but his own does nothing
Scarcely a day has gone by recently without Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and several other ministers decrying anti-Israel incitement. Netanyahu also routinely lambastes the “international community” for refusing to take action against such incitement. But while he’s clearly right about the importance of combating incitement, he’s on much shakier ground in blaming the world. After all, his own government has done nothing against leading purveyors of anti-Israel incitement. And how can he expect foreign governments to do what Israel won’t?
Granted, Israel has little leverage over some major inciters, like the Islamic State. But even when it does have leverage, it refuses to use it.
Take, for instance, the recent outrageous behavior of our ostensibly ally, Jordan. After Palestinian terrorists slaughtered four worshippers at a Jerusalem synagogue last week, the Jordanian parliament held a moment of silence in the terrorists’ honor and read a prayer from the Koran to “glorify their pure souls.” Jordan’s prime minister then wrote the terrorists’ families a condolence letter beseeching God to grant the killers “abundant mercy and satisfaction.” Adding insult to injury, all this happened just a week after Netanyahu, at the Jordanian king’s special request, had fully reopened the Temple Mount to Muslim worshippers despite the ongoing anti-Israel riots in Jerusalem.
One can imagine Washington’s response had the German parliament held a moment of silence to honor the perpetrators of the 9/11 attack, or London’s response had the French premier sent a condolence letter to families of slain Islamic State fighters after the organization executed a British aid worker. But Israel’s government? It hasn’t done a thing.
Yet there are many things Israel could do to punish such behavior. For starters, it could tell Amman that Jordanian demands regarding arrangements at the Temple Mount, which Israel has slavishly obeyed for years, will be ignored as long as such incitement continues.
It could also curtail material aid to Jordan. Last year, for instance, Israel agreed to provide additional water, beyond the amount mandated in the peace treaty, to help its water-starved neighbor cope with an influx of Syrian refugees. Yet it hasn’t demanded even the most minimal quid pro quo in exchange – that Jordan’s executive and legislative branches cease openly lauding the murder of Jews.
Similarly, with Syria in flames, Israel has become Jordan’s key land bridge for trade with the West. Thousands of trucks that used to travel between Jordan and Turkey via Syria now go through Israel to Haifa port, then by boat to Turkey, or vice versa. Israel gains nothing from this except a minimal amount in transit fees, so its economy would suffer no great loss if it ceased. For Jordan, however, it’s a lifeline, and it also greatly benefits Turkey, another serial anti-Israel inciter. Yet again, Israel hasn’t demanded even the barest minimum in exchange – an end to governmental incitement.
Needless to say, Israel has even greater leverage over a far worse inciter, the Palestinian Authority. PA President Mahmoud Abbas, other senior PA officials, Abbas’ Fatah party and the official PA media all spew vile anti-Israel incitement on a daily basis. On Saturday, for instance, Abbas accused Israel of setting wild boars to destroy Palestinian crops. Last month, he accused Jews of “desecrating” the Temple Mount, said they must be prevented from ascending it “in any way” and praised the attempted assassin of Rabbi Yehuda Glick as a “martyr” who would “go to heaven.” And though he condemned the synagogue killings under heavy U.S. pressure, a senior aide, the Fatah parliamentary faction and Fatah’s Facebook page all praised them.
Nevertheless, Israel continues massively subsidizing the PA – for instance, by giving it free electricity. Though the PA is technically supposed to pay, it rarely does; it currently owes the Israel Electric Corporation NIS 1.7 billion.
Israeli-Palestinian agreements allow Israel to deduct this debt from the taxes it collects on the PA’s behalf and transfers to Ramallah. Instead, Israel’s government has saddled its own citizens with the bill, contributing to the past few years’ soaring electricity rates. Yet in exchange for this generosity, it hasn’t even demanded the minimal quid pro quo of an end to anti-Israel incitement.
Additionally, about a fifth of all employed Palestinians work in Israel or the settlements. Israel has no treaty obligation to permit such employment; it could close its gates to Palestinian workers tomorrow if it wanted. That would devastate the Palestinian economy, and consequently the PA’s tax base. Yet Israel has never conditioned work permits for Palestinians on an end to incitement by the PA.
Another possibility is passing legislation that would make it easier for terror victims to sue the PA for incitement and/or material support for terror, while allowing any court-ordered damages to be deducted from Israel’s tax transfers to the PA. A particularly blatant example of such material support is the PA’s payment of salaries to convicted terrorists serving sentences in Israel. Even the lowest of these salaries far exceeds the average Palestinian wage, and they increase with the heinousness of the crime: Mass murderers, for instance, receive a monthly paycheck almost 10 times higher than those convicted of minor offenses. And these payments clearly incentivize terror. Just last week, Haaretz’s Hebrew edition reported on a Palestinian convicted of shooting at civilian buses who openly admitted that his main goal was money: Having run out of funds while building his house, he decided the simplest solution was getting himself arrested for anti-Israel terror, thereby guaranteeing himself a fat PA paycheck.
Israeli tax transfers to the PA total about $115 million a month, constituting an estimated 36 to 44 percent of the PA’s annual budget. Suitable legislation targeting incitement and material support for terror could easily enable this entire sum to be devoured by damage payments, forcing the PA to choose between mending its ways and bankruptcy.
The above are just a sampling of the varied tactics Israel could use to pressure its neighbors to end incitement. But the government refuses to utilize any of them. Instead, it makes do with empty condemnations, coupled with demands that other countries take the kind of forceful action it refuses to take itself.
Originally published in The Jerusalem Post